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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 55 MAY 1957 No. 7 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE INVENTION RIGHTS-
TIME TO LEGISLATEt 
Marcus B. Finnegan* and Richard W. Pogue** 
RECENT discussions of the current shortage of scientific man-power in the United States have focused national attention 
on the advantages and disadvantages to the individual of em-
ployment as a scientist or technician. This problem has par-
ticular significance with respect to employment by the federal 
government for two principal reasons. 
First, the number and importance of scientific personnel 
in the government have increased dramatically in recent years. 
Since the beginning of World War II the tremendous expenditures 
by the government for research and development have greatly 
increased the government's need for scientific manpower. Esti-
mates of federal government expenditures for scientific research 
and development reach 2.3, 2.4 and 2.7 billion dollars in the 
fiscal years 1955, 1956 and 1957,1 respectively, and these fig-
ures represent upwards of one-half of the total national expendi-
tures for research and development.2 Further, it is estimated 
t The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of any other person, the Department of the Army, or the Office of 
The Judge Advocate General. However, the authors wish to express their appreciation 
for the help and criticism given by Hon. Robert C. Watson, Commissioner of Patents, 
Lt. Colonel Willard J. Hodges, Jr., Chief, Patents Division, Office of The Judge Advocate 
General, Department of the Army, and Mr. Donald C. Snyder, Director, Patents Legal 
Division, Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy. 
• Member of the Virginia and District of Columbia Bars. B.S. 1949, United States 
Military Academy, LL.B. 1955, University of Virginia, LL.M. 1957, George Washington 
University; Captain, United States Army, Patents Division, Office of The Judge Advocate 
General.-Ed. 
•• Member of the Maryland Bar. A.B. 1950, Cornell University, J.D. 1953, University 
of Michigan. At the time of writing, First Lieutenant, United States Army Reserve, on 
active duty with Patents Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General.-Ed. 
l NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR SCIENCE (Y. The Federal Re-
search and Development Budget, Fiscal Years 1955, 1956, and 1957) 4 (1956). "Amounts 
for fiscal year 1957 are budget estimates and do not reflect congressional action or later 
modifications made by the agencies themselves." Id. at 17. 
2 AMERICAN ENGINEER, December 1956, p. 19; Remarks of Commissioner of Patents, 
Hon. Robert C. Watson, Report of Army Patent Conference, at 141 (1955). This report 
sets forth the proceedings of a March 1955 conference of over 200 Department of Defense 
and other government patent personnel; a copy is on file in the library of the University 
of Michigan Law School. 
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that 48 percent of expenditures in this field by the federal 
government for fiscal year 1957 will be obligated for "intra-
mural" work performed within the government's own research 
laboratories and facilities. 3 The federal government today is 
the nation's largest single employer of scientists and engineers.4 
In 1954 the government employed one out of every fifteen engi-
neers in the country.5 During that year the government em-
ployed in research and development and related scientific activities 
a total of 142,180 persons,6 of whom 102,371 were civilian scientists 
and engineers.7 The number of civilian engineers employed 
by the government mushroomed from 4,229 in 1931 to 43,272 
in 1954, an increase of 923 percent.8 
Second, the traditional disadvantages of government in com-
peting with industry for scientific talent, principally because 
of salary limitations,9 has become more serious recently,10 at 
a time when the requirements of national defense and the coun-
try's expanding technology call for added strength in govern-
3 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR ScIENCE (V. The Federal Re-
search and Development Budget, Fiscal Years 1955, 1956, and 1957) 12 (1956). This figure 
excludes federal funds, estimated to be obligated for research and development at profit 
organizations, educational institutions, research centers, and state governments. 
4 This fact, and the statistics which follow, are set forth in a draft report entitled 
FEDERAL MANPOWER ENGAGED IN SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES 1954, which, after pcssible minor 
revisions as a result of comments from various government agencies, will be published 
early this year by the National Science Foundation (hereinafter called "NSF Draft Report"). 
5 NSF Draft Report at 11-1. 
6 Id. at I-lB. 
7 Id. at II-3A. 
8 Id. at ll-9B. See also UNIVERSITY TRAINING FOR THE NATIONAL SERVICE (University 
of Minnesota Press, 1932). 
9 Statistics prepared by the Los Alanios Scientific Laboratory of the University of 
California indicate that in 1953 the average monthly salary of industrial research scientists 
and engineers with over 20 years experience was $779 for those with a B.S. and $863 for 
those with a. Ph.D. Comparable figures for government employ were $609 and $716. 
NATIONAL ScIENCE FOUNDATION, SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL R.E.sOURCES 22 (1955). It is not 
irrelevant that, "the Government's share of tlle nation's scientific manpower rose during 
the Depression years, but has declined since World War II." NSF Draft Report at II-4A. 
10 " ••• [T]he Federal Government •.• is feeling the manpower pinch along with 
other users. This is not a new problem, but it has been growing in severity, and it is 
now receiving study for action in the next Congress at the highest governmental level.'' 
.AMERICAN ENGINEER, December 1956, p. 19. 
"Nor is it any secret that our Government is facing grave difficulties in obtaining the 
necessary key scientific personnel to keep pace with the requirements of modern-day warfare. 
"Our committee hearings on this legislation disclosed that inability to attract and 
retain competent top-level scientific, professional, technical and administrative personnel 
is one of the most pressing probleins faced by the Department of Defense, National 
Security Agency and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Private industry 
· has found the necessity for such top-level personnel, and private industry is prepared to 
pay substantially higher wages than is the Government under existing legislation. 
" ••• The condition is particularly evident in the field of research and development." 
Remarks of Congressman John E. Henderson, Ohio, on H.R. 11040, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 
102 CONG. R.Ec. A4936 aune 21, 1956). 
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mental research and development.11 The immediacy of this 
problem is indicated by the fact that the President has appointed 
a high level committee to study the question and prepare a re-
port for submission to the President and Cabinet looking to-
ward early executive action and subsequent legislation.12 
A natural inference from these statistics is that personnel 
policies and other actions affecting the interests of scientific 
personnel in the government are no minor matter, but have 
an impact on a significant part of the country's scientific re-
sources. One important concern in this area is the extent of 
the legal rights of such personnel in their inventive creations, 
as against their employer, and as against other persons. Thus the 
determination of the relative rights (between government and 
employee) in inventions made by government employees, while 
an old problem,13 has recently acquired new significance. 
It is the purpose of this article to review judicial standards 
applicable to the determination of rights in inventions made 
by employees of the federal government, to note statutory pro-
visions affecting the problem, to examine the content and ef-
fect of the present Executive program for determining such 
rights, to review and evaluate two fundamental and conflicting 
theories in this field, and to propose legislation establishing ap-
propriate standards and procedures. This topic is believed to 
have general interest because, in addition to the urgencies sug-
gested above, the problem touches some of the basic legal philos-
ophy underlying the United States patent system. 
I. Judicial Standards 
Under the patent laws, only the "inventor" may apply for 
a patent.14 However, the courts recognize and enforce property 
11 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMrITEE FOR .AERONAUTICS, CrusIS IN THE RECRurr-
MENT AND R.En:NTION OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Septem• 
ber 1956). 
12 This committee, entitled Committee on Engineers and Scientists for Federal Govern-
ment Programs, is headed by the President's Adviser on Personnel Management and 
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. It includes representatives of the major depart-
ments and agencies which employ engineers and scientists. An idea of the comprehensive 
scope of the committee's investigation of the problem is given by a list of its subcommit-
tees: (I) Numbers, Kinds, Levels of Engineers and Scientists in the Government; (2) 
Comparison of Government Scientific Pay Levels of Engineers and Scientists with those 
in Other Sectors of the Economy; (3) Comparison of Other Benefits; (4) Attitudes of 
Scientists Toward Government Employment; (5) Turnover Analysis; (6) Recruitment 
Activities; (7) Utilization. AMERICAN ENGINEER, December 1956, p. 19. 
13 See discussion in Parts I and X infra. 
14 35 U.S.C. (1952) §Ill. But see id., §118 (permitting an assignee, or a person "who 
otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter justifying such action," to 
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interests in patents and inventions. Thus, a patent may issue 
to an assignee,15 and patent applications and patents are as-
signable.16 Patents have "the attributes of personal property,''17 
and before the grant of a patent an inventor has a qualified 
property interest in his invention.18 Questions of ownership 
of or license under inventions or patents are not governed by 
the patent statutes but must be resolved by the courts. A re-
curring judicial problem is the determination of the relative 
rights in an invention as between an inventor and his employer; 
it is a problem which has confronted the federal government in 
its capacity as an employer for many years. 
The most important judicial decision involving inventions 
made by government employees is United States v. Dubilier 
Condenser Corporation.19 In this case the United States sued 
the Dubilier company as exclusive licensee of three patents, 
seeking assignment of the patents to the government, as equitable 
owner, and an accounting. The facts were not in dispute. Two 
physicists employed by the National Bureau of Standards, Dun-
more and Lowell, had been assigned to the Radio Section of the 
Bureau's Electrical Division to perform research and testing in 
its laboratory. The Radio Section consisted of approximately 
twenty scientists, who were divided into various separate working 
groups. Dunmore and Lowell worked in a group which had been 
assigned the task of solving problems in the field of "airplane 
radio"; the subject of "radio receiving sets" was assigned to 
one of the other groups in the Radio Section. 
While engaged in an assigned project involving the solution 
of design problems in the "airplane radio" field, Dunmore and 
Lowell conceived of and perfected two inventions involving 
the application of alternating house current in lieu of direct 
battery current to (1) a radio receiving set and (2) a dynamic 
file an application if the inventor refuses to execute the application or cannot be found 
or reached after diligent effort. However, any patent which issues under such circum-
stances is granted to the inventor and not the applicant. The purpose of the section 
is to preserve the rights of the assignee). 
15 35 u.s.c. (1952) §152. 
16 Id., §261. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Burton v. Burton Stock-Car Co., 171 Mass. 437, 50 N.E. 1029 (1898) and cases 
therein cited; Marcalus Mfg. Co. v. Sullivan, 142 N.J. Eq. 434, 60 A. (2d) 330 (1948). 
19 289 U.S. 178 (1933). Claims of all three patents involved in the Dubilier litigation 
were later held invalid. Lowell v. Triplett, (4th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 521, cert. den. 
305 U.S. 634 (1938). See also Radio Corporation of America v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 
(3d Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 305 at 309, cert. den. 287 U.S. 648 at 650 (1932) (two of the 
three held invalid). 
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loud-speaker. Dunmore alone made a third invention involv-
ing the application of alternating current to (3) a telegraph 
relay. These inventions were made at least partially during 
working hours, and were developed with government contri-
butions of facilities, equipment and materials and with the 
knowledge and approval of the inventors' superiors. The in-
vention relating to the application of alternating current to 
radio receiving sets solved one of the problems which had 
been assigned to the "radio receiving sets" group of the Radio 
Section. However, "there was no assignment by Dr. Dellinger, 
or by any other superior to these two employees of the Radio 
Section of any research problem involving the inventions in 
controversy. The most that can be said is that Lowell and 
Dunmore were permitted by Dr. Dellinger, after the inventions 
had been brought to his attention, to pursue their work in the 
laboratory and perfect the inventions which had theretofore 
been made by them."20 Shortly after the completion of their in-
ventions Dunmore and Lowell as joint inventors, and Dunmore 
as sole inventor of one of the inventions, filed separate appli-
cations covering each of the three inventions. In due course 
patents were issued to the inventors, who exclusively licensed 
them to Dubilier. 
The defendant did not contest the proposition that the 
government was entitled to an irrevocable, nonexclusive, roy-
alty-free license or "shop right"21 because of the government 
contributions of time, materials, equipment and facilities used 
in making the inventions,22 but contended that the govern-
ment was not entitled to an assignment of the patents. The 
district court dismissed the bills,23 the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit affirmed,24 and the Supreme Court took the 
case on certiorari. 25 
20 Opinion of the district court, United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., (D.C. 
Del. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 306 at 311. 
21 On scope of the license enjoyed by an employer under the "shop right" doctrine, 
see Flannery Bolt Co. v. Flannery, (3d Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 43 at 44, cert. den. 309 U.S. 
671 (1940); Wiegand v. Dover Mfg. Co., (N.D. Ohio 1923) 292 F. 255 at 261; Barber v. 
National Carbon Co., (6th Cir. 1904) 129 F. 370; Tin Decorating Co. v. Metal Package 
Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 1006, affd. (2d Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 5; Thompson v. 
American Tobacco Co., (4th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 773; COSTA, LAw OF INVENTING, IN 
EMPLOYMENT 25-35 (1953). 
22 This doctrine originated in McClurg v. Kingsland, I How. (42 U.S.) 202 (1843). 
See also Hapgood v. Hewitt, ll9 U.S. 226 (1886). 
23 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., (D.C. Del. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 306. 
24 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., (3d Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 381. 
25 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 287 U.S. 588 (1932). 
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In a 6 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ments of the lower courts, and held that the government was 
not entitled to an assignment of the patents issued to Dunmore 
and Lowell. In stating the reasons for this holding, the opinion 
of the Court, written by Justice Roberts, was divided into several 
steps. 
In the first step,26 the Court noted that the basis for the 
grant of a patent to an inventor ~n the United States is Ar.tide 
I, section 8, clause 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress 
the power "to promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their ... Discoveries." As the opinion explained, a patent which 
has been created by Congress as the implementation of the 
constitutional provision is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly, 
because it does not take anything from the people but gives 
them something of value which they were unable to enjoy 
prior to its discovery by the inventor. The patent is granted 
to the inventor in consideration of his disclosing to the com-
munity the nature of the invention and the means for putting 
it to practical use in his patent application. In exchange for 
his disclosure, the patentee is granted the exclusive use of the 
invention for a statutory term of seventeen years, but at the 
expiration of that time the invention becomes public property 
or is dedicated to the public. 
The Court stated, "A patent is property."27 From this con-
clusion flow the subsidiary principles that title to a patent 
may pass only by assignment, that an agreement to assign a 
patent may be specifically enforced if the agreement is valid 
as a contract, and that the relative rights of an employer and 
employee in an invention made by the latter derive from the 
contract of employment. 
If an employee is specifically employed to make a partic-
ular invention and successfully accomplishes the task for which 
he was employed, it is clear that the resulting invention is the 
subject of the contract of employment, and the employee may 
be required to assign the invention to his employer.28 If the 
contract of employment is general, however, even though it 
26 289 U.S. 178 at 186 (1933). 
21 Id. at 187. 
28 Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924). 
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covers a field of endeavor to which the invention relates, it will 
not be construed so broadly as to require an assignment to the 
employer.29 
The Court acknowledged that there could be an express 
agreement between employer and employee requiring the em-
ployee to assign his patents30 but stated that courts have been 
reluctant to imply any such agreement. The explanation for 
this fact lay in the unusual or dual nature of the act of "in-
vention," as that term of art is used in the United States patent 
laws. Thus under the patent law an inventor will not be per-
mitted to obtain a patent covering a concept or idea, but he 
must demonstrate a practical application or embodiment of 
the mental concept.31 In the absence of an agreement to as-
sign, when an employee makes an invention and uses his em-
ployer's time, facilities, equipment, or materials to construct 
a practical application or embodiment of the invention (iden-
tified in patent terminology as a "reduction to practice"), the 
employer is entitled by operation of law to a nonexclusive right 
to make and use the invention; this is a matter of equitable 
principles. "But the employer in such a case has no equity to 
demand a conveyance of the invention, which is the original 
conception of the employee alone, in which the employer had 
no part. This remains the property of him who conceived it, 
together with the right conferred by the patent, to exclude all 
others than the employer from the accruing benefits."32 
29 Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886); Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 
149 U.S. 315 at 320 (1893) ("But a manufacturing corporation, which has employed a 
skilled workman, for a stated compensation, to take charge of its works, and to devote 
his time and services to devising and making improvements in articles there manufac-
tured, is not entitled to a conveyance of patents obtained for inventions made by him 
while so employed, in the absence of express agreement to that effect''). 
so 289 U.S. 178 at 187 (1933). Similarly, an agreement to assign future inventions 
is valid and specifically enforceable as long as it is reasonably limited in time and scope. 
Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. Miller, (9th Cir. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 353; Guth v. Minn. 
Mining &: Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 385, cert. den. 294 U.S. 711 (1935), and 
cases there cited. [However, "a naked assignment or agreement to assign, in gross, a 
man's future labors as an author or inventor-in other words, a mortgage on a man's 
brain, to bind all its future products," constitutes an unreasonable restraint contrary to 
public policy. See Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, (C.C. N.J. 1887) 32 F. 697 at 700, appeal 
dismissed, 140 U.S. 669 (1891)]. On the subject of express contracts by employees to 
assign inventions or patents, see generally COSTA, LAW OF INVENTING IN EMPLOYMENT 112-
126 (1953); Knoth, "Assignment of Future Inventions," 27 Cm-KENT L. REv. 295 (1949). 
81 E.g., Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481 at 489 (1891) ("A 
conception of the mind is not an invention until represented in some physical form''); 
Wayne v. Humble Oil &: Refining Co., (5th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 230. 
82 289 U.S. 178 at 189 (1933). 
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A fair result is thus achieved through recognition of the 
dual nature of invention, and through application of contractual 
and equitable principles. Unless the employee has promised to 
assign an invention to his employer (by an express contract, or 
by an agreement implied from conduct or the terms of a specific 
employment or assignment to invent), he is permitted to retain 
that portion of the invention which was his contribution alone, 
the conception or idea. The right retained by the inventor is 
the fundamental right of the patent, the right to exclude all 
persons other than his employer from practicing the invention. 
The employer is accorded that part of the invention which is 
mainly his contribution. He is allowed the right to make and 
use the invention in its practical form ("shop right"). The 
Court concluded that these rules of law are settled with respect 
to private employment. 
In the second step, the Court considered whether rules of 
law different from those applicable in private employment should 
apply in determining the relative rights between the government 
and its employees.33 It announced the rule that "the title of 
a patentee is subject to no superior right of th,e Government."34 
In arriving at the conclusion that "The statutes, decisions and 
administrative practice negate the existence of a duty binding 
one in the service of the Government different from the obliga-
tion of one in private employment,"35 the Court quoted with 
emphasis the following famous dictum from an 1890 case, 
Solomons v. United States: 36 
33 Id. at 189-192 (1933). The Court cited several early cases, in addition to the 
Solomons and Gill cases, discussed infra. In James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1882), the 
Court, in holding invalid a patent on a postmarking and stamp-cancelling device, stated 
important dicta to the effect that a patentee is entitled to compensation in a proper case 
even if his invention is usable only by the government as, for example, munitions of 
war. See also Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59 at 67 (1885). In accord were 
the decisions in two cases in which Army officers successfully sued the government for 
royalties to compensate for use of patented inventions, United States v. Burns, 12 Wall. 
(79 U.S.) 246 (1871) (express royalty contract); United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 
(1888) (contract implied in fact). As to implying an obligation to pay compensation from 
a license which is silent on the matter but is otherwise supported by consideration, see 
McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424 (1893). 
34 Cf. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 at 358 (1882): "The United States has no 
such prerogative as that which is claimed by the sovereigns of England, by which it can 
reserve to itself, either expressly or by implication, a superior dominion and use in that 
which it grants by letters patent to those who entitle themselves to such grants. The 
Government of the United States, as well as the citizen, is subject to the Constitution; 
and when it grants a patent, the grantee is entitled to it as a matter of right, and does 
not receive it, as was originally supposed to be the case in England, as a matter of grace 
and favor." 
35 289 U.S. 178 at 192 (1933). 
36 137 U.S. 342 at 346 (1890). 
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"The government has no more power to appropriate a 
man's property invested in a paterit than it has to take his 
property invested in real estate; nor does the mere fact that 
an inventor is at the time of his invention in the employ of 
the government transfer to it any title to, or interest in it. 
An employe, performing all the duties assigned to him in his 
department of service, may exercise his inventive faculties in 
any direction he chooses, with the assurance that whatever 
invention he may thus conceive and perfect is his individual 
property. There is no difference between the government 
and any other employer in this respect."31 
In the third step in the opinion, the Court noted that the 
proofs in the case fell far short of sustaining the government's 
contentions that the inventors were specifically assigned to 
make the inventions. However, the Court went on to discuss 
the government's secondary position-that despite the lack of 
a specific assignment to make the invention, the government 
was entitled to ownership because the inventions were "with-
in the general field of their research and inventive work."38 
This point deserves comment. 
The government's position was apparently based on the "fac-
tual assumption that all research work in the Bureau is pri-
marily concerned with invention and is so closely related to 
it as to be practically a part of it."39 Although both lower courts 
had rejected the government's contention,40 not only by deny-
ing the existence of the asserted factual equivalency but also 
by rejecting the argument as in reality a proposed new legal 
doctrine,41 the Supreme Court's two-stage analysis on this point 
was not entirely clear. 
37 Emphasis supplied by the Court in the Dubilier opinion, 289 U.S. 178 at 191 (1933). 
88 Id. at 193. 
39 (3d Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 381 at 385. 
40 49 F. (2d) 306 at 311; 59 F. (2d) 381 at 385. The circuit court of appeals charac-
terized the government's contention as follows: "'Inventions made by an employe in 
connection with his work and within the scope of his work, whose duties include the 
carrying on of research or inventive work,' become the sole property of the employer 
together with accompanying patents." The court noted, "If the proposition were re-
formed and made to read, that inventions of an employee, specifically employed or 
assigned to make them, are the sole property of the employer, we should approve it on 
authority of" the Solomons, Gill, Standard Parts, and Houghton cases, discussed infra, 
and Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., (7th Cir. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 739. 
41 "Failing [establishment of the factual equivalency] we are back to the general law 
which forbids us laying down a new principle that, if invention occurs in the general 
field of an employee's occupation, the employer would, without regard to the facts that 
control the law in varying situations, be entitled to receive the fruits of the employee's 
invention." 59 F. (2d) 381 at 385. 
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First, the Court concluded that the facts and circumstances 
precluded the implication of an agreement by the inventors to 
assign their inventions or patents. In the course of this anal-
ysis the Court made several statements, such as that the in-
ventors "did not agree to exercise their inventive faculties,"42 
and "in no proper sense may it be said that the contract of 
employment contemplated invention."43 The generality of these 
statements unfortunately creates some confusion as to the rationale 
of the opinion. By implication these statements seemed to 
assume the validity of the proposition urged by the government, 
but to reject its applicability on the facts. In a dissenting 
opinion Justice Stone concluded, on the basis of this lapse, 
that the Court had established a new relaxed substantive rule 
(whether the contract of employment "contemplates" invention) 
as to what the employer must show to establish an implied 
agreement to assign.44 
Second, the opinion stated that the courts are not the proper 
agency to establish a new legal doctrine, which was what the 
government really was proposing, that "public policy . . . for-
bids one employed by the United States, for scientific research, 
to obtain a patent for what he invents."45 
Despite this disavowal of the government's argument, the 
Court's momentary failure, in characterizing the factual sit-
uation in the case, to state expressly that it was proceeding 
arguendo, left room for the dissent to interpret the majority 
opinion as establishing a new doctrine that "wherever the em-
ployee's duties involve the exercise of inventive powers, the 
employer is entitled to an assignment of the patent on any in-
vention made in the scope of the general employment."46 This 
interpretation of the rationale of the :!Ilajority opinion is be-
lieved to be unwarranted. Nowhere did the majority opinion· 
acknowledge a change in doctrine. The discussion in the first 
42 289 U.S. 178 at 193. 
43 Id. at 194-195. 
44 Stone, J., dissenting, id. at 209 and 213. 
45 Id. at 197. 
46 Stone, J., dissenting, id. at 213-214. The dissent reasoned, "The opinion of this 
Court apparently rejects the distinction between specific employment or assignment and 
general employment to invent, adopted by the court below and supported by authority, in 
favor of the broader position urged by the government. • • • As I view the facts, I think 
such a rule, to which this Court has not hitherto given explicit support, would require 
a decree in favor of the government." See also the discussion of the majority and dissent-
ing opinions of Dubilier in Kreeger, "The Control of Patent Rights Resulting from Federal 
Research," 12 I.Aw & CoNTEM. PROB. 714, 716-717, n. 17, n. 18 (1947). 
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and second steps of the opinion established that the Court 
intended to reaffirm traditional judicial standards. Subsequent 
lower court opinions cite or quote Dubilier as declaratory of 
traditional judicial standards47 and do not mention any change 
in doctrine. It is believed that the Dubilier case accords with, 
and makes applicable to government employment, the usual 
rule48 that the courts will not compel an employee to assign 
to his employer the title to an invention, even though made in 
the course of his employment, unless either (1) there is a 
valid express contract requiring him to assign, or (2) such a 
contract can be fairly implied from the fact that the employee 
was specifically hired or assigned to make the invention which 
he subsequently created.49 Further, Dubilier does not disturb 
the precedents holding that the circumstances of the making 
of the invention may be such that on equitable principles the 
employer will be entitled to a royalty-free nonexclusive license 
(shop right). 
In the fourth and fifth steps of the opinion, the Court re-
viewed prior legislative activity in the field and concluded that 
although the problem was properly a legislative matter, Con-
gress had enacted no laws imposing on employees a contractual 
obligation of the type urged by the government. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stone, although postu-
lating that dicta in the majority opinion had established a new 
47 E.g., Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 87 at 93; Hey-
wood-Wakefield Co. v. Small, (1st Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 716 at 717, cert. den. 301 U.S. 
698 (1937); Barton v. Nevada Consol. Copper Co., (9th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 381 at 384; 
Crown Cork&: Seal Co., Inc. v. Fankhanel, (D.C. Md. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 611 at 617 ("There 
is nothing in [Dubilier] which modifies the principle announced in the earlier cases"). 
48 This conclusion is supported by the Court's disposition of the government's con-
tention that the inventions and patents should be declared to be held in trust for the 
United States because all the work of the Bureau was in the public interest: "The trust 
cannot be express. Every fact in the case negatives the existence of one. Nor can it 
arise ex maleficio • ••• And, as we have seen, no such trust has been spelled out of the 
relation of master and servant, even in the cases where the employee has perfected his 
invention by the use of his employer's time and materials. The cases recognizing the 
doctrine of shop rights may be said to fix a trust upon the employee in favor of his 
master as respects the use of the invention by the latter, but they do not affect the title 
to the patent and the exclusive rights conferred by it against the public." 289 U.S. 178 
at 196-197 (1933). 
49 Or from other unequivocal conduct, such as employee statements that the work was 
for the employer's benefit and resulting inventions would be assigned to the employer, 
or a knowledge of, and personal enforcement of, a custom of the shop to assign inventions. 
Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., (3d Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 215. On implied 
agreements to assign, see generally COSTA, I.Aw OF INVENTING IN EMPLOYMENT 90-92, 109-
112 (1953), and cases there cited; notes, 23 CoL. L. REv. 311 (1923); 36 IIARv. L. REv. 
468 (1923); 12 MINN. L. REv. 670 {1928); 30 CoL. L. REv. 1172 (1930); 46 HARv. L. REv. 
149 (1932); 22 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 429 (1947). 
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standard (whether the employment contract "contemplates in-
vention") for establishing an implied agreement to assign in-
ventions, disagreed with the fundamental proposition that the 
question of the employer's right to an assignment is a matter 
of contract. Urging that the purported new rule of the Court 
was too mechanical, he suggested that it is really a matter of 
equity whether the employee will be ordered to assign title to 
the employer, not a mere matter of contract. From this it fol-
lows that the "function of the Court in every case is to de-
termine whether the employee may, in equity and good con-
science retain the benefits of the patent,"50 a conclusion which 
permits a distinction to be drawn between public and private 
employment. The dissent asserted that where the work is 
accomplished in a government laboratory supported by public 
monies, the government must be free to use the results for the 
benefit of the public. And in order for the full benefit 
to be derived, a shop right is insufficient and the government 
must have title. Justice Stone acknowledged that a require-
ment of full title in the situation where the invention is only 
within the general scope of employment might be an advance 
beyond the decided cases, but saw nothing revolutionary in 
this step. He believed that the result of the case was "repug-
nant to common notions of justice and to policy as well, and 
the case must turn upon these considerations if we abandon 
the illusion that equity is called upon merely to enforce a con-
tract, albeit, one that is 'implied.' "51 
Another important case dealing with the relative rights be-
tween the government and its employees is Solomons v. United 
States/2 in which the Supreme Court held that the government 
was not liable as an infringer to the assignee of a patent for 
a self-cancelling revenue stamp which was invented and developed 
by the Chief of the Bureau of Engra.ving and Printing of the 
Treasury Department. The inventor had been assigned the duty 
of devising a revenue stamp, and he had accomplished this duty 
with the use of government machinery, property and services. 
The Court based its holding on a finding that the government had 
acquired a shop right to use the invention, and the plaintiff was 
60 Stone, J., dissenting, 289 U.S. 178 at 216 (1933). 
51 Stone, J., dissenting, id. at 218. Cardozo, J., concurred in Stone's dissent. Hughes, 
C.J., in a separate dissenting opinion, agreed with the factual and legal analysis of Stone's 
dissent, and stated that the appropriate remedy would be to "cancel" the patents. 
52 137 U.S. 342 (1890). For discussion of this and other early cases, see Clinton, "The 
Patent Status of Federal Employees," 22 GEO. L. J. 58 (1933). 
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estopped to sue the government for such use. Although the Court 
rested its holding on the finding of a shop right, the opinion 
contained a famous and important dictum: 
"If one is employed to devise or perfect an instrument, 
or a means for accomplishing a prescribed result, he cannot, 
after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was 
employed, plead title thereto as against his employer. That 
which he has been employed and paid to accomplish becomes, 
when accomplished, the property of his employer. Whatever 
rights as an individual he may have had in and to his inven-
tive powers, and that which they are able to accomplish, he 
has sold in advance to his employer."53 
Six years after its decision in the Solomons case, the Court in 
Gill v. United States54 gave added vitality to this dictum by stating: 
"There is no doubt whatever of the proposition laid down 
in Solomons case, that the mere fact that a person is in the 
employ of the government does not preclude him from mak-
ing improvements in the machines with which he is con-
nected, and obtaining patents therefor, as his individual prop-
erty, and that in such case the government would have no 
more right to seize upon and appropriate such property, 
than any other proprietor would have. On the other hand, 
it is equally clear that, if the patentee be employed to invent 
or devise such improvements his patents obtained therefor 
belong to his employer, since in making such improvements 
he is merely doing what he was hired to do. Indeed, the Solo-
mons case might have been decided wholly upon that ground, 
irrespective of the question of estoppel, since the finding was 
that Clark had been assigned the duty of devising a stamp, 
and it was understood by everybody that the scheme would 
proceed upon the assumption that the best stamp which he 
could devise would be adopted and made a part of the re-
vised scheme."55 
Like Solomons, the Gill case was concerned with the determina-
tion of rights in an invention made by an employee of the govern-
ment. The inventor in the Gill case had made several inventions 
while employed as a machinist in a government arsenal, and he 
sued the government upon an alleged implied contract for com-
pensation for use of his inventions. As in Solomons the real basis 
for the holding in the Gill case was not that the employee had 
53137 U.S. 342 at 346 (1890). 
54 160 U.S. 426 (1896). 
55 Id. at 435. 
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been employed to invent but rather that the government was 
entitled to a shop right due to the circumstances of the making 
of the inventions, and that the employee was estopped to claim 
compensation for their use by the government. 
Finally in 1924 the Court affirmed the dictum of Solomons 
by an outright holding in a case involving private employment, 
Standard Parts Co. v. Peck.56 This case arose when an employee 
sought to sue the successor of his employer for infringing his 
patent on an invention made while he was employed by the pre-
decessor of the defendant. The Court reversed the court of 
appeals and affirmed the decree of the district court, which had 
required an assignment of legal title to the defendant, since the 
employee had contracted to devote his time and efforts toward 
the development of the invention which resulted. In other words, 
the employee solved the specific problem which he was hired to 
solve. In reaching this decision the Court acknowledged its debt 
to the famous dictum of Solomons: 
"It is going very far to say that the declaration of Solo-
mons v. United States, repeated in subsequent cases, and ap-
parently constituting their grounds of decision, may be put 
aside or underrated-assigned the inconsequence of dicta. It 
might be said that there is persuasion in the repetition. It 
cannot be contended that the invention of a specific thing 
cannot be made the subject of a bargain and pass in execu-
tion of it."57 
The decision in Standard Parts Co. v. Peck firmly established 
the principle that where an employee is "employed to invent," 
the employer is entitled to an assignment of the patent rights in 
any invention which results directly from the terms of employ-
_ment. A lower federal court later added a corollary to this rule 
in a case involving government employment, to the effect that 
not only could an employee who was originally hired to make 
specific inventions be required to assign inventions within the 
scope of his employment, but also if an employee hired for general 
employment was thereafter assigned to develop a specific inven-
tion, a resulting invention would become the property of the 
employer. This principle was announced in Houghton v. United 
56 264 U.S. 52 (1924). 
57 Id. at 59. 
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States,58 which decided that the government was equitable owner 
of a patent which had been granted to one of its employees. The 
language adopted by the court is as follows: 
"The right of the employer to the invention or discovery 
of the employee depends, not upon the terms of the original 
contract of hiring but upon the nature of the service in which 
the employee is engaged at the time he makes the discovery 
or invention, and arises, not out of the contract of hiring but 
out of the duty which the employee owes to his employer 
with respect to the service in which he is engaged. It matters 
not in what capacity the employee may originally have been 
hired, if he be set to experimenting with the view of making 
an invention, and accepts pay for such work, it is his duty to 
disclose to his employer what he discovers in making the 
experiments, and what he accomplishes by the experiments 
belongs to the employer. During the period that he is so 
engaged, he is 'employed to invent,' and the results of his 
efforts at invention belong to his employer in the same way 
as would the product of his efforts in any other direction. 
"59 
Although the rule of the Houghton case has never been con-
sidered by the Supreme Court, it seems a logical and equitable 
extension of the Standard Parts rule. An employer is not rigidly 
bound by the express terms of the original contract of employ-
ment but may in effect modify the contract and assign employee 
inventors to various specific problems as these arise in the em-
ployer's business with the same protection to which he would 
have been entitled had the resulting inventions been specifically 
called for in the original employment contract. 
II. Executive Activity - Content and Administration 
of Executive Order 10096 
On January 23, 1950, President Harry S. Truman signed Ex-
ecutive Order I 009660 to provide for "a uniform patent policy for 
the Government with respect to inventions made by Government 
employees and for the administration of such policy." The 
58 (4th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 386, cert. den. 277 U.S. 592 (1928), affg. (D.C. Md. 1927) 
20 F. (2d) 434-. Accord, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, (9th Cir. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 
353; contra, Texas Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., (S.D. Tex. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 873, affd. (5th 
Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 394, cert. den. 278 U.S. 625 (1928). 
59 23 F. (2d) 386 at 390 (1928). 
60 37 C.F.R. (Supp. 1956) §300, 32 J.P.O.S. 724 (1950). 
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policies and provisions contained in this executive order had been 
recommended strongly by a 1947 Report of the Attorney General 
to the President ( discussed in Part V below). 
Executive Order 10096, which is still in effect, is administered 
by the chairman of a Government Patents Board (GPB) es-
tablished by the order. This board consists of the independent 
chairman and a representative from each cabinet department and 
executive agency (except the Atomic Energy Commission) which 
is substantially concerned with inventions made by government 
employees. A brief consideration of the substantive terms of the 
order may be helpful. 
Paragraph 1 sets forth the substantive criteria for determining 
the relative rights between the government and its employees in 
inventions. Paragraph 1 (a) provides: 
"The Government shall obtain the entire right, title and 
interest in and to all inventioris made by any Government 
~mployee 
"(1) during working hours, or 
" (2) with a contribution by the Government of facili-
ties, equipment, materials, funds, or information, or of time 
or services of other Government employees on official duty, or 
" (3) which bear a direct relation to or are made in con-
sequence of the official duties of the inventor." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The disjunctive criteria set forth in paragraph 1 (a) are broad 
and sweeping and would include within their terms, if literally 
applied, most inventions made by government employees. The 
one exception is the category of invention made by an employee 
solely on his own time, without any government contribution, 
in a field entirely unrelated to his assigned duties. 
However, paragraph I (b) of the order provides that if the 
government contribution as determined by the criteria of para-
graph I (a) is "insufficient equitably to justify a requirement of as-
signment to the Government" (emphasis added) (or if the gov-
ernment is not sufficiently interested in an invention to require 
title), the executive agency concerned, if it has the approval of 
the chairman of the Government Patents Board, shall permit the 
employee to retain title to the invention "subject, however, to 
the reservation to the Government of a non-exclusive, irrevocable, 
royalty-free license in the invention with power to grant licenses 
for all governmental purposes." 
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Paragraph I (c) describes four categories of employment in 
the research and development field. If an employee is assigned 
or employed in any one of the four categories, paragraph I (c) 
establishes the presumption that any invention made by him 
falls within the purview of paragraph I (a).61 Any invention 
made by an employee whose assigned duties are outside the 
enumerated categories is presumed to fall under paragraph I (b) 
(title in employee and license to the government). Either of 
the presumptions of paragraph I (c) may be rebutted by the facts 
or circumstances surrounding the making of a particular inven-
tion, and notwithstanding all the for~going provisions of the 
order a determination under paragraph I (d) is not precluded. 
Paragraph I (d) states that whenever the facts do not entitle 
the government to either an assignment under paragraph I (a) or 
a license under paragraph I (b), the entire right, title and interest 
to the invention shall be retained by the employee, "subject to 
law." 
It is believed to be fair to state that Executive Order I 0096 
is a remarkable departure from the law governing employee 
rights in inventions as it had been carefully developed by the 
Supreme Court in the sixty years before 1950. Under a strict 
or literal construction of paragraph I (a) of the order the govern-
ment is required to take an assignment of full title from an em-
ployee-inventor merely because his invention is made during 
working hours, or with some contribution by the government. 
If the employee's assigned duties involve almost any conceivable 
relationship to research or development work,62 a presumption 
is raised that the government is entitled to an assignment, and 
the burden is placed upon the employee to rebut this presump-
tion by establishing pertinent facts or by satisfying an administra-
tive official that it would be "inequitable" for the government 
61 These four categories of employment cover situations in which an employee is 
employed or assigned: (1) to invent or improve any subject matter which falls within 
the class of patentable inventions; or (2) to conduct or perform research or development 
work; or (3) to supervise, direct, coordinate, or review government financed or conducted 
research or development work; or (4) to act in liaison capacity among agencies or indi-
viduals engaged in such work. In practice perhaps the most difficult problem of inter-
pretation of these classifications has involved inventors who are government patent attor-
neys or agents. These individuals come within the strict judicial control established 
in such cases as Reusch v. Fischer, (C.C.P-.\. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 818; Phillips Screw Co. v. 
Givnan, 200 Ore. 279, 256 P. (2d) 253 (1953); Goodrum v. Clement, (D.C. Cir. 1922) 277 
F. 586; and yet do not seem to be covered expressly by any of the four categories listed 
in paragraph 1 (c) of Executive Order 10096. 
62 See note 61 supra. 
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to demand an assignment. These harsh rules are a far cry from 
the strong recognition accorded to the property rights of em-
ployees in their inventions which was established in Dubilier 
and other leading cases. 
Legal objections to Executive Order 10096 have been raised 
in the seven years since its issuance, such as the proposition that 
the order is unconstitutional. 63 This argument proceeds on the 
theory that executive orders must be based on either valid dele-
gations of power from Congress or specific powers of the ·Presi-
dent granted by Article II of the Constitution, 64 if issued in the 
absence of such authority they constitute an improper attempt 
at executive legislation.65 Because Executive Order 10096 on 
its face runs contrary to judicial principles which would other-
wise obtain, 66 in effect it is an attempt, so the argument runs, by 
the President to legislate rules governing the disposition of 
private property, improper by analogy to the Steel Seizure case.67 
At best, constitutionality of the order can be said to be subject 
to serious legal doubts. Uncertainty of its status has lingered in 
the absence of judicial te_st.68 
In administering the order, the first chairman of the GPB 
was confronted with the stringency of its terms. (The board itself 
is purely advisory and does not participate in the decision-making 
process.) However, in the opinion of the authors, based on in-
63 See Gerber, "Patents-Inventions by Federal Employees and Contractors-Disposi-
tion of Title and Rewards," 35 J.P.O.S. 426 (1953). "Can the President, by an executive 
order, change the patent status of government employees so as to deprive them of either 
the valuable right in the application or the personal property of the patent grant to 
which they were entitled under the common law?" Id. at 428. 
64 Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 at 585 (1952): "The President's 
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself." 
65 "In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws 
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." Id. at 587. 
66 See discussion of prior judicial standards, Part I supra. 
67Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The recitation of 
authority in Executive Order 10096 (" .•• by virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution and statutes and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces of the United States") is practically identical to the recitation in 
Executive Order 10340, which was in issue in the Steel Seizure case. With respect to the 
attempt to justify the order under authority of Rev. Stat. §161 (1876), 5 U.S.C. (1952) 
§22, see note 166 infra. 
68 Legality of the order also has been questioned, as applied to employees the begin-
ning of whose employment antedates 1950, in view of the limitations on executive dis-
cretion to alter compensation set by statute. The argument is that the right to retain 
commercial rights in inventions was part of the employees' compensation prior to issuance 
of the order, and cannot be affected by mere Executive action. See Gerber, "Patents-
Inventions by Federal Employees and Contractors-Disposition of Title and Rewards,'' 
35 J.P.O.S. 426 at 433-434 (1953). 
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terviews and analyses of representative cases,69 the chairman in 
general departed from the literal strictness of the policies of the 
of the order and applied instead principles consistent with the 
judicial standards of the Dubilier and other cases discussed above.70 
69 In analyzing the administrative decisions of the chairman during the period fiscal 
years 1951 through 1955, it is convenient to group the decisions according to their general 
facts in the following categories: 
(1) Full title has been retained by the inventor: 
(a) Where there was no contribution of time, materials, facilities, equipment, 
funds, or information by the government and no relation of the invention to the inventor's 
duties; or 
(b) Where there was no significant government contribution and 
(i) the equity in the government was insufficient because it was merely that the 
employee's awareness of the problem arose in some manner through his employment; or 
(ii) the equity in the government was insufficient because the relation of the 
invention to the general field of the inventor's official duties was only slight, or because 
the invention was insufficiently related to those duties to justify the requirement of a 
license to the government; 
(c) Where there were minor or insignificant government contributions but they 
were equitably insufficient to overcome a lack of relation of the invention to the inven-
tor's official duties. 
(2) Title has been left with the inventor subject to a license to the government: 
(a) Where there was no government contribution of time, facilities, materials, 
equipment, funds, or information, but there was a substantial though indirect relation 
of the invention to the inventor's official duties; 
(b) Where there was a government contribution and/or a direct relation of the 
invention to the inventor's duties sufficient to justify an assignment, but the government 
was not sufficiently interested in the invention to require an assignment; 
(c) ·where there was a government contribution and/or a direct relation of the 
invention to the inventor's duties sufficient to require an assignment, but due to special 
facts or circumstances it was determined that the requirement of an assignment would 
be inequitable. 
In each of the nine cases during this period in which the chairman determined 
that the government was entitled to an assignment, the critical factor was the close 
relation between the invention and the inventor's duties. 
Cf. Forman, "The Government Patents Board-Determination of Patent Rights in 
Inventions Made by Government Employees," 35 J.P.O.S. 95 (1953). 
70 This view is held by the former chairman (Dr. Archie l\f. Palmer) himself: 
"During the five years, from 14 June 1950 through 30 June 1955, that I was Chair-
man of the Government Patents Board, I rendered 1376 decisions under Executive Order 
10096, on review of determinations by various Government agencies of the respective 
rights and interests of the inventors and of the Government in and to inventions made 
by Government employees on and after 23 January 1950. 
"Those decisions were rendered and Executive Order 10096 was administered during 
that period in accordance with existing case law, as established in such cases as United 
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); United States v. Houghton, 20 
F. (2d) 434 (D. Md. 1927) aff'd, Houghton v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 386 (4th Cir. 
1928); Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 
424 (1893); Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896); and Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 
264 U.S. 52 (1924). 
"In the administration of the Government's patent policy under Executive Order 
10096, as well as in the rendering of my decisions, during the period that I was Chairman 
of the Government Patents Board, the Government was treated the same as a private 
employer, as established in the case law, and the respective rights of the inventors and 
the Government were determined accordingly on the basis of the information submitted 
by the Government agencies with their determinations and supplemented, where neces-
sary, by additional information obtained from the inventors in order to arrive at an 
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(This result was accomplished primarily by reliance on the term 
"insufficient equitably" appearing in paragraph 1 (b).)71 
The significance of this conclusion is severely limited by the 
fact that the order does not provide for review by the chairman 
of cases in which there is an uncontested agency determination 
that the government is entitled to an assignment, and the chairman 
has not assumed any such power of review. Thus, in spite of the 
avowed purpose of the order to provide a uniform policy through-
out the executive branch, uniformity has not been achieved in 
practice because assignment determinations are reviewed by the 
chairman only in the rare case of an appeal by an employee. Each 
agency can control the policy applicable to its own employees. 
Accordingly, in those agencies which favor a policy of strict inter-
pretation and application of the criteria of paragraph 1 (a) of the 
order, the ratio of assignment cases to total cases naturally tends 
-to be much higher than the comparable ratio in those agencies 
which construe and apply Executive Order 10096 less strictly.72 
equitable decision in each case." Letter to the authors dated January 9, 1957, on file in 
Michigan Law Review offices. 
Insufficient time has elapsed since assumption of office by the second chairman, Mr. 
Benjamin B. Dowell, on July 1, 1955, to warrant conclusions as to interpretation and 
application of the order since that date . 
. 'll In a talk which he gave at the U.S. Navy Electronics Laboratory in San Diego, 
California on May 27, 1953, Dr. Archie M. Palmer, the first Chairman, GPB, made the 
follo~ing statement: 
"The Order itself contains the general or basic principles of the policy. Those prin-
ciples have in many instances been misunderstood. ••. The first paragraph is. often 
misleading and has misled, confused, and upset many inventors. • • • The four para-
graphs must of necessity' be considered in their entirety. The first paragraph often is 
mistaken as the policy. It is subject to great misunderstanding unless viewed in the 
light of the subsequent paragraphs. . •• 
"Now in interpreting the first paragraph in the light of the subsequent paragraphs 
and the administration o~ the program, I am going to first change the words, 'the 
Government shall obtain the entire right, title and interest in the invention' to these 
words, 'that the Government may be' entitled to obtain.' In other words, if these circum-
stances exist, there is a possibility of the Government obtaining an assignment. . • . 
Paragraph 2 [sic] shows that it is a matter of equity here, i.e., whether the contributions 
of the Government are sufficient equitably to justify an assignment to the Government.'' 
Forman, "United States Patent Ownership Policy and Some of its Administrative Implica-
tions," 38 J.P.O.S. 647 at 665 (1956). 
72 This conclusion is supported by a startling comparison of statistics concerning 
activities of the Agriculture and Navy Departments. In operations under Executive Order 
10096 from January 1950 through December 31, 1956, the Department of Agriculture made 
526 determinations of rights; in 471 of these cases the government required an assignment 
and in 24 the invention was published or dedicated to the public; in the same period the 
Department of the Navy had 1661 cases, in 616 of which the government required an 
assignment and in three of which dedication by publication was required. (The residue 
in each case represents the inventions in which the government obtained only a license 
or no rights.) Thus the ratio of assignments (and dedications) to total cases during this 
period was 94.1% in Agriculture, and 37.3% in the Navy. Sources: Government Patents 
Board, Department of the Navy, Department of Agriculture. It is believed that this 
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Illustrative of the effect of this procedural limitation is the fact 
that despite the equitable administration of the order by the chair-
man with respect to the cases which he is able to review, the annual 
percentage of assignment as compared with the total number of 
employee cases in which the government" has an interest has in-
creased alarmingly since issuance of the order, 73 as has the per-
centage of assignments as compared with the total number of all 
cases (i.e., cases in which the government received an assignment, 
a license, or no interest).74 The explanation for this inconsistency 
is probably that personnel in the agencies responsible for admin-
istering the order have felt bound to make their determinations 
in accordance with the strict terms and intent of the order rather 
than under the more liberal rules of case law. In view of the 
fact that certain agencies such as the Department of Agriculture 
disparity is far too great to be explained merely on the basis of different conditions of 
employment which might distinguish the two departments. 
73 The following table shows the number of assignments and licenses, and the per-
centage of the total represented by assignments, acquired by the government in each 




























































































Source: Forman, "United States Patent Ownership Policy and Some of its Adminis-
trative Implications," 38 J.P.O.S. 647 at 665-666 (1956); and Government Patents Board. 
74 Government Patents Board activities were in full operation by 1952. The statistics 







































Source: Forman, "United States Patent Ownership Policy and Some of its Adminis-
trative Implications," 38 J.P.O.S. 647 at 665-666 (1956); and Government Patents Board. 
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traditionally obtained an extremely high percentage of assign-
ments prior to issuance of the order,75 the rise in the percentage 
on a government-wide basis must be attributed to actions taken 
within the agencies which traditionally favored a policy less 
stringent than the terms of the order. 
III. Legislative Consideration 
Although government employee rights in inventions is a sub-
ject most appropriately the concern of Congress,76 legislation in 
this field has consisted of a few piecemeal enactments of essentially 
unrelated statutory provisions. Attempts at comprehensive legis-
lation have been made, but only a handful of isolated proposals 
have become law. 
The first statute affecting government employees' rights in 
their inventions was the act of July 8, 1870, which has been codi-
fied- in Title 35, United States Code, substantially in its original 
. form.77 This provision bars employees of the Patent Office from 
applying for patents, or from acquiring any interest ( except by 
inheritance or bequest) in any United States patent issued or to 
be issued, during the period of their employment and for one 
year thereafter. The provision is a salutary one, designed not to 
discriminate against a certain class of employee-inventors, but 
rather to assure that employees of the Patent Office use independ-
ent judgment in acting on applications pending in the office. 
The Appropriation Act of March 3, 1883, as amended, the 
pertinent section78 of which is now codified as 35 U.S.C. §266, 
provides that the Commissioner of Patents may grant a patent 
to any officer, enlisted man, or employee of the government ( except 
Patent Office employees) without payment of any fees, if the 
head of a department or agency certifies that the invention "is 
used or likely to be used in the public interest." The act also 
requires the employee to stipulate in the application and in any 
75 From 1910 to 1927 the Department of Agriculture obtained 259 patents of which 
254 (or 98%) were dedicated to the public, and from 1926 to 1943 the department obtained 
675 patents of which 600 were either dedicated to the public or assigned to the govern-
ment; the inventors were permitted to retain title to the remaining 75 patents subject 
to a nonexclusive royalty-free license to the government-only 11% of the total. Depart-
ment of Agriculture Monograph, 2 REP. ATIY. GEN. 25 (1947). 
76 See discussion, Part X infra. 
77 35 U.S.C. (1952) §4. In addition to the statutes discussed in the text, the Atomic 
Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, to the extent that they denied issuance of, or authorized 
the Atomic Energy Commission to affect title to, patents in the atomic energy field, 
correspondingly affected employees' rights in inventions. 
78 22 Stat. 625, amended by act of April 30, 1928, 45 Stat. 467. 
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patent which may issue thereon that the invention may be manu-
factured and used by or for the government for governmental 
purposes without payment of royalty. The statute affects em-
ployees' rights only in a limited way, for it is permissive, not man-
datory. Prior to 1928 this act required the employee to stipulate 
that the invention, if brought under the provisions of the act, 
could be used royalty-free by the government "or by any other 
person in the United States." (Emphasis added.) The quoted 
language was subject to two interpretations - it opened the in-
vention either to free public use (dedication) or only to free 
governmental use. The Attorney General ruled that the latter 
interpretation was proper,79 but in 1924 a federal district court 
ruled that the statutory language resulted in dedication of any 
patent obtained under the act.8° Congress was requested to amend 
the law in order to encourage government employees to obtain 
patents on their inventions and to assure protection of the govern-
ment's interests; it did so in 1928.81 It is believed that the 1928 
amendment evidences legislative recognition of the beneficial 
effects as an incentive to be derived from leaving commercial 
rights in employee inventions with the employee.82 
The first statute specifically providing for determination of 
title to employee invention and patent rights was the Tennessee 
Valley Act of 1933,83 which provides that title to inventions (and 
any patents thereon) made by employees working under the act 
"shall be the sole and exclusive property of the Corporation." 
79 32 OP. ATIY. GEN. 145 (1920). This holding accorded with an opinion of The 
Judge Advocate General of the Army, 2 OPS. J.A.G. 1029 (1918), characterized in the 
Dubilier case as a "well-reasoned opinion,'' which was based on the theory that if the 
statute were construed to require dedication, the so-called patent would amount to 
nothing more than a publication or prior reference. 
so Squier v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1924) 21 F. (2d) 747. Judge Knox 
concluded that even if this interpretation were incorrect, plaintiff by his actions and 
statements had effectively dedicated to the public the patent sued on. This alternative 
holding, which prompted the Supreme Court in Dubilier to label the statutory inter-
pretation "dicta,'' was affirmed, (2d Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 831. See also Hazeltine Corp. 
v. Electric Service Engineering Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 18 F. (2d) 662; Hazeltine Corp. 
v. A.H. Grebe & Co., (E.D. N.Y. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 643; and Selden Co. v. National Aniline 
& Chemical Co., (W.D. N.Y. 1930) 48 F. (2d) 270. 
81 Act of April 30, 1928, 45 Stat. 467. 
82 Contra, Stone, J., dissenting in the Dubilier case, 289 U.S. 178 at 220-221: 
" ... this purpose was not, as the opinion of the Court suggests, born of a Congressional 
intent that a government employee who conceives an invention in the course of his 
employment should be protected in his right to exclude all others but the government 
from using it. .•• The purpose of Congress • . . was to protect the existing right of 
the government to use all devices invented in the service. • . ." 
83 Act of May 18, 1933, 48 Stat. 58, as amended, 16 U.S.C. (1952) §§831-83ldd. The 
employee invention provision is set forth at 16 U.S.C. (1952) §83ld (i). 
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The corporation was authorized to grant licenses and to "pay 
to such inventor such sum from the income from sale of licenses 
as [the board of directors of the corporation] may deem proper." 
Under this legislation, the TV A developed a system by which 
the government, in cases in which the TV A has little interest in 
the invention, grants an exclusive license (with the right to grant 
sublicenses) to the employee, subject to a royalty-free nonexclusive 
license to the government. 
Section 12 (b) of the National Science Foundation Act of 
195084 provides in part that "no officer or employee of the Founda-
tion shall acquire, retain, or transfer any rights, under the patent 
laws of the United States or otherwise, in any invention which he 
may make or produce in connection with performing his assigned 
activities and which is directly related to the subject matter there-
of .... " This subsection, enacted three years after publication of 
the recommendations of the '1947 Attorney General's Report, dis-
cussed below, was the result of extensive congressional discussion 
during the period 1945-1950 as to what patent provisions should 
be included in the act.85 Although the quoted language is some-
what vague and general, it is believed that the subsection sub-
stantially adopts prior judicial standards. 
The most recent legislative action affecting employees' rights 
in inventions was the 1952 amendment to the statute known to 
most patent attorneys as the act of 1910,86 or 28 U.S.C. §1498. 
84Act of May 10, 1950, 64 Stat. 154, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1871. 
~5 Although a bill concerning national scientific resources had been introduced and 
considered in hearings as early as 1942 in the 77th Congress (S. 2721, 77th Cong., 2d sess;), 
the impetus toward legislation creating a federal agency to administer a balanced research 
program for the nation was received in 1945. For discussion of the various proposals 
and testimony in the 1945-1946 period concerning the controversial question of the proper 
patent provision to be included in the proposed science legislation, see 3 REP. ATTY. GEN, 
221-281 (1947). See also 27 CoNG. DIG. 297-320 (1948). Illustrative of patent debate is 
testimony on the bill (S. 247, 81st Cong., 1st sess.) which became the National Science 
Foundation Act of 1950. Hearings :Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st sess.; at 68-72, 77-78, 87, 110-112, 120-124, 
125-132, 134-136, 150-151, 157-159, 162-171, 184-186 (1949). . 
86 Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 851. This act was revised by act of June 25, 1948, 
62 Stat. 941, as amended, 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1498; the present statute is referred to in 
later text as 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1498. 
Prior to the Act of 1910 a patentee seeking to recover compensation for use by the 
United States of a patented invention was required to establish a contract, express or 
implied, by which the government promised to pay for such use. United States v. :Bums, 
12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 246 (1871); United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888); Cramp & 
Sons v. Curtis Marine Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28 (1918) (dicta, in a suit against a govern-
ment contractor). No recovery could be had where the circumstances, such as the govern-
ment's assertion of a shop right, were inconsistent with a promise to pay. Knapp v. 
United States, 46 Ct. CI. 601 (1911). Cf. Kelton v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 314 (1897); 
E. W. :Bliss Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 187 (1920). See also McKeever v. United States, 
14 Ct. CI. 396 (1818). In the absence of contract, the patentee had no remedy, Schillinger 
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By this statute the government has consented to suit in the Court 
of Claims for compensation for patent infringement committed 
by or for the government. Prior to the 1952 amendment, the 
statute contained a disability provision stating, "This section 
shall not confer a right of action on any patentee who, when he 
makes such a claim, is in the employment or service of the United 
States, or any assignee of such patentee, and shall not apply to 
any device discovered or invented by an employee during the 
time of such employment or service." Legislative history87 in-
dicates that this proviso in its original form was believed neces-
sary primarily to prevent employees from using their official posi-
tions in order to induce use of an invention by the government 
and thus to lay the basis of a claim against the government. By 
1952 government operations had become so complex that no in-
dividual employee was likely to have sufficient power or in-
fluence to accomplish the evil results feared in earlier times, a 
fact apparently recognized by Congress. Accordingly, the proviso 
was deleted and the following statutory language was substituted: 
"A Government employee shall have the right to bring 
suit against the Government under this section except where 
he was in a position to order, influence, or induce use of the 
invention by the Government. This section shall not confer 
a right of action on any patentee or any assignee of such pat-
tentee with respect to any invention discovered or invented 
by a person while in the employment or service of the United 
States, where the invention was related to the official func-
tions of the employee, in cases in which such functions in-
cluded research and development, or in the making of which 
Government time, materials or facilities were used."88 
The House Committee on Patents, in reporting out the bill, 
stated in part: "The right to sue, pursuant to this bill, in large 
part, follows title under the present law as established by the 
Dubilier case and similar decisions."89 This, the most recent 
v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894); United States v. Berdan Firearms Co., 156 U.S. 
552 (1895) (dicta); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896) (dicta, in a suit against govern-
ment official), unless Congress enacted special jurisdictional acts, such as those involving 
employees barred from suit by the proviso in the act of 1910, Dahlgren v. United States, 
16 Ct. Cl. 30 (1880); Talbert v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 141 (1890); Gates v. United States, 
87 Ct. Cl. 358 (1938); Shearer v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 40 (1938); Van Meter v. United 
States, (2d Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 192. 
87 E.g., 45 CONG. R.Ec. 8767, 8772-8773, 8782-8783, 8785 (1910). See also H.R. Rep. 
1726, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952). 
88 Act of July 17, 1952, 66 Stat. 757. 
so H.R. Rep. No. 1726, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 3 (1952). 
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congressional declaration in the field of employee invention rights, 
demonstrates legislative recognition of the judicial standards es-
tablished in the Dubilier and other opinions, although here too 
the statutory language is imprecise. 
These statutes are diverse in origin, objective, and result; 
clearly they do not present an organized legislative pattern for 
uniform treatment of government employees' invention rights. 
The closest resemblance to establishment of a pattern is the 1952 
amendment to 28 U.S.C. §1498, which, although directed at pro-
tection of the government shop right, reflects, in imperfect lan-
guage and in legislative history, judicial standards for determining 
title as well. The government has ruled administratively that 
determinations under Executive Order I 0096 will not stand if 
they conflict with 28 U.S.C. §1498.90 Validity of Executive Order 
10096 (on questions of title as well as license) perhaps would 
have been tested in the courts by this time had the order been 
applied by the administering official literally rather than in con-
formance with the judicial standards summarized in Dubilier~ 
and with the legislative standards stated in the 1952 amendment 
of the Act of 1910 and supporting legislative history. 
IV. Conflicting Policy Considerations-
Title vs. License Theory 
In the evolution of practices for determining federal employee 
invention rights in the past half century, two extreme views have 
emerged. One of these views, which may be characterized loosely 
f!S the "title theory," was best expressed in the 1947 report of 
the Attorney General to the President, entitled "Investigation of 
Patent Practices and Policies."91 In this report the Attorney 
1lO An opinion of the comptroller general established that the government may not 
contract to pay royalties based on use of an invention made by an employee whose duties 
or use of government facilities or materials bring him within the employee disability 
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1498, despite a determination by the Government Patents Board 
under Executive Order 10096 leaving full title in the employee with no license to the 
government. 108 U.S.P.Q. 271 (1956). Note that in this type of determination by the 
GPB, made under paragraph 1 (d) of the executive order, the form prescribed by the 
order states that title is left with the employee "subject to law." Supra at p. 21. Queare: 
does "law" in this sense include the limitations of 28 U.S.C. §1498? If so, of what efficacy 
is a GPB determination that the employee is entitled to a l (d) {all rights) decision rather 
than a l (b) (title subject to government license) decision? 
91 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT (un-
dated, but usually cited as a 1947 document), hereafter referred to as the "Attorney 
General's Report" or "Rep. Atty. Gen." The three-volume, 982 page report was the 
product of a four-year study requested by a letter from the President to the Attorney 
General dated February 5, 1943. The study and report covered the government's patent 
and invention policy with respect to contractors as well as employees. 
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General, after an exhaustive study of agency practices, recom-
mended the following policy for the executive branch of the 
government: 
"(I) The Government should obtain all rights to in-
ventions made by its employees: 
"(a) during working hours; or 
" (b) with a substantial contribution by the Govern-
ment in the form of facilities, equipment, mate-
rials, funds, information, time or services; or 
"(c) bearing a direct relation to the employee's official 
functions. 
" (2) In other cases, where there is some Government 
contribution, or some relationship between the invention 
and the employee's official functions, but where these are 
clearly insufficient to warrant assignment to the Government 
of all rights to the invention, as determined by the Govern-
ment agency concerned, with the approval of the Government 
Patents Administrator, ownership of the invention should be 
left to the employee, subject to a nonexclusive, irrevocable, 
royalty-free license to the Governm~nt, and also subject to 
the obligation on the part of the employee or his assignee to 
make the invention available to the public on reasonable 
terms. 
"(3) In all other cases, the employee should retain all 
rights to the invention, subject to existing provisions of law."92 
Although published ten years ago, the Attorney General's 
Report is acknowledged to be the best exposition of the title theory. 
Directly contrary to this view is the approach which may be 
termed the "license theory." This approach postulates that the 
government should take no more than a royalty-free non-exclusive 
license in any case, even if the invention was the direct result of 
a specific assignment of duty. The license theory was followed 
by several agencies, notably War and Navy Departments, at various 
times prior to issuance of Executive Order 10096 in January 
1950.93 
Each of the theories is inadequate in several respects. 
92 l REP. ATIY. GEN. 2 (1947). 
93 I REP. ATIY. GEN. 24, 39. The report stated that this theory was realized in 
practice by the military departments even at times when their regulations purported to 
follow common law standards. Id. at 24. 
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V. Analysis of Title Theory 
The recommendations of the 1947 Attorney General's Report 
(which eventually became the substance of Executive Order 
10096)94 accorded substantially with traditional policies of the 
Department of Agriculture, which since the turn of the century 
had generally required that employees' patent rights be assigned 
to the government or dedicated to the public.1115 The arguments 
in support of this• theory are set forth in detail in the Attorney 
General's Report; they may be briefly summarized and criticized 
as follows: 
(I) The Report asserts that inventions financed with govern-
ment funds or produced in the course of a federal function should 
inure to the benefit of the public, and that this result cannot be 
assured unless the inventions made with appropriated monies 
are controlled by the government. Further, because "the great 
bulk of inventions made by Federal employees ... result[s] 
from an operation of Government financed with public appropria-
tions,"96 their use should not be denied the public which paid for 
them through taxation, nor should the public be charged a royalty 
for their use because the royalty charge would in effect be a second 
tax for use of the inventions. 
These arguments, the core of the "title theory," have an ap-
pealing ring because they are cast in the language of the public 
interest. They are fundamentally defective, however, in their 
unspoken assumption that almost all inventions made by federal 
employees equitably belong to, and are paid for by, the govern-
ment as agent of the public. To the extent that this argument is 
applied to fact situations justifying ownership in the government 
under established judicial standards, it has merit. But. the case 
law, particularly the Dubilier opinion, is a measurement of the 
area of inventions which belong to the public; to the extent that 
title argument is applied to inventions lying outside this area, 
94 For a discussion of the extent to which the executive order was coordinated within 
the government prior to issuance, see Chap. VI of Forman, "United States Patent Owner-
ship Policy and Some of its Administrative Implications," 38 J.P.O.S. 534 at 535-551 (1956). 
:95 Monograph, "Patent Policies and Practices of the Department of Agriculture Con-
cerning Inventions of its Employees and Contractors," 2 REP. Am. GEN. 3-22, 36-37 
(1947). The employee was permitted to retain title, subject to a license to the govern-
ment, if the invention was unrelated to his official duties ·and was made on his own time 
and with his own funds and facilities. This category of inventions was about 10% of 
the total, over a period of 40 years. Relaxation of the policy following the Dubilier case 
caused dissatisfaction in Agriculture bureau chiefs, and a strict policy was later reinsti-
tuted. For more detailed statistics on Agriculture practices see note 75 supra. 
96 l REP. ATIT. GEN. 30 (1947). 
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the government is acquiring more than it is fairly entitled to. In 
the latter situation, the public will not only avoid double payment 
- it will avoid any payment at all, because by definition Gudicial 
standards) it never really paid for the inventions in the first 
place. This is the critical weakness in the structure of the "title 
theory." 
(2) In addition to this affirmative argument, the Attorney 
General's Report urged that the "license theory," and other views 
which would permit employees to retain patent rights, are de-
fective for several reasons. Retention of commercial rights by 
employees was said not to be a necessary form of incentive. "[A]s 
a rule the scientific or technical worker in the Government has 
little interest in obtaining or exploiting patent rights."97 This 
proposition is allegedly supported on several grounds: 
(a) Agencies which have followed a "title theory" have not 
found that such a policy affects their ability to attract or retain 
competent personnel. (There are a number of answers to the 
asserted success of "title" agencies in retaining competent per-
sonnel, e.g., the unpatentable nature of the work involved,98 self-
serving statements of officials,99 and ignorance of employees of 
the fact that other agencies had a more lenient policy [prior to 
the Attorney General's comprehensive compilation of agency 
practices]. Further, testimony indicating the contrary is avail-
able.100) 
97 Id. at 40. Cf. discussion of activity of a grievance committee of an employees' 
union in the Department of Agriculture, 2 REP. ATIY. GEN. 13 (1947). See also note 143 
infra. 
98 In 1955 the Department of Agriculture, cited by the Attorney General's Report 
as strongly favoring the "title" policy, spent 15.3% of its research and development ex-
penditures on basic, as opposed to applied, research. Comparable percentages for the 
Department of Defense, and the entire government, were 1.3 and 6.4 respectively. NA-
TIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR SCIENCE (V. The Federal Research and 
Development Budget Fiscal Years 1955, 1956, and 1957) 10 (1956). Almost all discoveries 
resulting from basic research do not constitute patentable subject matter. 
99 Proof of the value or lack of value of commercial rights as an incentive is d.ifli. 
cult, and is often unavailable to support opinions offered on the subject. See, however, 
notes 140-143 infra, and accompanying text. 
100 See discussion at notes 140-142 infra, and accompanying texL See also 2 REP. 
ATIY. GEN. 274-275 (1947). The opinion of the district court in the Dubilier case, (D.C. 
Del. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 306 at 312, stated: 
"In commenting upon the retirement of Dr. Samuel W. Stratton, formerly Director 
of the Bureau of Standards, President Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, said: 
" 'While the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is to be congratulated on securing 
Dr. Stratton, one cannot overlook the fact that the desperately poor pay which our govern-
ment gives to great experts makes it impossible for us to retain men capable of perform-
ing the great responsibility which is placed upon them. The Institute of Technology, 
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(b) The majority of educational and industrial organizations 
do not permit their employees to retain commercial rights. (The 
citation of industrial practices is unconvincing in view of the 
variety of alternative incentives available to private concerns, 
such as promotions, salary increases, bonuses, stock options, and 
royalty-sharing plans.101 Further, the statement is debatable.102 
Scientific personnel in educational institutions have special in-
centives inducing them to remain at their jobs despite the loss 
of patent rights, such as freedom from restrictions on their work, 
active contact with students, and academic prestige.103) 
(c) Patent rights are of such uncertain value as to provide at 
best a speculative incentive.104 (The uncertainty of the value of 
the incentive does riot justify elimination of the incentive - a 
chance of success is far more appealing than no chance at all -
as the patent system itself attests.) 
(3) A third argument set forth in the Report was that even 
if retention of commercial rights does in fact constitute a material 
incentive to government employees, it is an undesirable form of 
incentive, because: 
an educational institution, finds no difficulty in paying a man of Dr. Stratton's calibre 
three times the salary the government is able to pay him. 
" 'Dr. Stratton has repeatedly refused large offers before, but the inability of the 
scientific men in the government to properly support themselves and their families under 
the living conditions in Washington and to make any provision for old age makes it 
impossible for any responsible department head to secure such men for public service 
at government salaries.' 
"Under such conditions, should the normal reward of inventors be withheld from 
research workers in the Bureau of Standards? I think not. To do so would measurably 
crush the inventive genius, enthusiasm, and spirit of the employees. It would drive 
unusual men out of the public service and correspondingly lower the efficiency of the 
Bureau. If the rules of law heretofore prevailing are to be extended to bring about this 
result, resort should be had to the Congress and not to the courts." 
101 For surveys of industrial practices, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, 
TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL REsEARCH AND PATENT PRAcrICES 66-70 (undated but apparently 
published in 1948), which analyzes the practices of 684 corporations; and Rossman, 
"Stimulating Employees to Invent," 18 J.P.O.S. 110, 189 (1936) (233 "large corporations"). 
The NAM survey states (at 68) that 35% of reporting corporations divulged that their 
inventors received extra compensation for meritorious inventions. 
102The NAM survey, supra note 101, indicated, at 67, that only 344 of the 684 
reporting corporations required assignment agreements from employees on their research 
and engineering staffs. . 
103 The President's Scientific Research Board, 4 SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (Man-
power for Research) 17 (1947); id., vol. 3 (Administration for Research) 206, 212-216 
(1947). 
104 The substantial value of commercial rights in some cases is reported. See, e.g., 
2 REP. Arn. GEN. 197, 256, 269-270, 450 (1947). Note also that an accounting for profits 
and damages was decreed in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., (W.D. N.Y. 1953) 
119 F. Supp. 42, affd. (2d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 530, cert. den. 350 U.S. 911 (1955), a 
case involving an invention made by a government employee which "supplanted the 
existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field." 224 F. (2d) 530 at 535. 
1957] FEDERAL EMPLOYEE INVENTION RIGHTS 933 
(a) It may lead to secretiveness and lack of cooperativeness 
on the part of the employees, including the withholding or con-
cealment of new ideas from their employers or fellow employees. 
(This argument presents only one side; if an employee knows 
he will be required to assign title to his invention he may conceal 
his inventive concepts in anticipation of disclosure after separation 
from the government.105 Further, an employee who becomes 
secretive in his work can be transferred or given different job 
assignments.) 
(b) Retention of commercial rights may create conflicts of 
interest disabling employees from acting in the fields in which 
they are qualified; examples supposed include situations in which 
the employee is in a position to induce or recommend use of an 
invention by the government or its contractors, or to test or ap-
praise competing inventions. (The rare employee who may be 
in a conceivable "conflict of interest" situation can disqualify 
himself, be transferred to a different job assignment,1°6 or can be 
made subject to penal laws.107 In this connection, it is sometimes 
maintained that unless the government follows the title theory 
or something akin thereto its research and development contractors 
will be cautious in disclosing new developments to government 
scientific personnel working in the field who might stand to 
benefit from special knowledge gained through close contact with 
such contractors, and that the government may thereby lose valu-
able opportunities to learn of new developments not specifically 
covered by existing contracts. The basic fallacy in this argument 
is that it should not make a significant difference whether the 
105 This practice, and the practice of "bootlegging" an invention to an outside source 
because of the inability of the employee-inventor to retain any rights in his invention, 
are clearly unlawful or fraudulent. One government employee noted that the "title'" 
policy, in the absence of a strong, realistic incentive awards program, might cause the 
government inventor to decide that "his personal advantage lies in concealing an important 
invention until after severing Federal employment." Part II, ARMED SERVICES PATENT 
POLICY REVIEW BOARD REPORT, infra note 141, at 32 (1952). 
106 An example is cited in 2 REP. ATTY. GEN. 198 (1947). 
101 See generally act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 691, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §202; 62 Stat. 
694, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §216; 62 Stat. 697 (as amended, May 24, 1949, 63 Stat. 90), 18 
U.S.C. (1952) §281; 62 Stat. 698 (as amended, May 24, 1949, 63 Stat. 90), 18 U.S.C. (1952) 
§284; 62 Stat. 749, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §1001; 62 Stat. 753, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §1018; 62 Stat. 
793, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §1914. Army Regulations 600-205, expressly requires any member 
of the service assigned to procurement and related activities to report to his superiors 
any situation in which "he finds that his duties require him to act as an agent of the 
United States in a manner from which he may derive financial profit or other benefits"; 
in such cases he must divest himself of his interest, disqualify himself, or be relieved 
from his assignment. It is probable that other agencies have comparable regulations. 
Some agencies in the past have specifically required employees to report any commercial 
arrangements concerning patent rights. 2 REP. ATTY. GEN. 448-449 (1947). 
934 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
government follows a title policy or a liberal policy of permitting 
inventors to keep their commercial rights whenever possible, 
because under either policy contractors would stand to lose all 
rights to these inventions if government employees should choose 
to claim inventorship. Under a liberal or license theory title 
would usually be retained by the government employees, and 
under a title theory, would usually be in the government itself; 
but it would never be in the contractors if it is assumed that the 
government employees would be successful in their claims of in-
ventorship. Even if the government followed a strict title policy, 
there would still be an incentive for its employees to want to file 
applications on worthwhile inventions, because at the very least 
they would receive recognition and credit for making the invention 
and would in some cases be eligible for cash awards. The latter 
incentives are sufficient to induce government employees to file 
applications when, as assumed under this argument, the real 
effort of conception or making of the inventions has already been 
performed by contractors. A further answer to this argument is 
that contractors should take advantage of the protection which is 
afforded by the patent laws against possible theft or misappropria-
tion of inventions and protect themselves by prompt filing of ap-
plications. If a contractor is the first to conceive an invention and 
files his application with reasonable promptitude, he should have 
no trouble in successfully asserting his rights over possible adverse 
claims of a latecomer government employee. The usual remedies 
outside the patent laws for theft of ideas or inventions are also 
available to contractors. Government agencies could require their 
employees whenever they submit a disclosure to execute state-
ments averring that they did not derive the invention from infor-
mation obtained from a government contractor. Such a require-
ment would seem to be superfluous, however, in view of the oath 
which each inventor is required to make upon filing an applica-
tion in the Patent Office affirming that he believes himself to be 
the original and first inventor of the matter claimed in the applica-
tion as patentable.) 
(c) Retention of commercial rights may cause employees 
to become overly "patent conscious" to the detriment of their 
assigned work; they may devote greater energies to work on in-
ventions with commercial promise. (The employee who be-
comes unduly "patent conscious" can be kept in bounds by nor-
mal persuasion or change of specific job assignment.) 
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( d) Retention of commercial rights results in ineqmt1es, 
because as an incentive it discriminates against nontechnical 
personnel, and against those technical personnel who are in the 
field of basic, as distinguished from applied, research. (The 
argument concerning discrimination seems farfetched - because 
a man technically trained in a certain field makes an invention 
entitling him to a patent does not mean that those who do not 
make inventions are thereby victims of discrimination. Other-
wise the patent system itself would be considered unfairly dis-
criminatory.) 
These four arguments urging the undesirability of patent 
rights as an incentive seem to have more theoretical than actual 
basis, and the first three bespeak a lack of faith in the integrity 
of federal employees which, with occasional exceptions, is un-
supported. Further, as discussed after each of these arguments, 
independent sanctions are available to combat the supposed evils 
and prevent their occurrence. 
Upon reflection it will be seen that almost all of these argu-
ments advanced by the Attorney General's Report in favor of 
a "title theory" may be applied with equal pertinency in favor 
of abolition or radical change of the principles upon which the 
American patent system itself is based.108 
VI. By-Product of the Title Theory - Government 
Ownership of Patents 
An additional difficulty with the title theory is that, as illus-
trated by the Attorney General's Report, the emphasis on gov-
ernment- ownership of invention rights is usually accompanied 
by a recommendation that the government practice of prose-
cuting patent applications and obtaining patents be contin-
ued.109 Although the matter of administration of government-
owned inventions and patents is subsidiary to the main issue of 
this article, it is so closely related as to require limited discussion.11° 
10s Arguments against employee retention of commercial rights as an incentive are 
essentially arguments against the use of patent rights per se as incentives to invent. But 
the idea of the patent as a stimulus to invention is one of the cornerstones supporting 
the philosophy of the United States patent system. Perhaps the Attorney General's 
Report is an unconscious reflection of the "restrictionist" attitude current at the time 
it was written. An adoption of the restrictionist viewpoint would presuppose an advocacy 
of fundamental and far-reaching changes to the structure of the patent system. See 
notes 148-151 infra, and accompanying text. 
109 Cf. I REP. Am. GEN. 126-130 (1947). 
110 On this subject generally, see S. Doc. 83, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1923); Second Report 
of the National Patent Planning Commission, H.R. Doc. 22, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1945), 
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A number of legal objections have been raised with respect 
to any system based upon government acquisition of title to 
patents. These objections go to the heart of the constitutional 
basis for the patent system. 
First, under the contract theory of patents the patent is con-
sidered to be a contract111 under which the government grants 
exclusive rights for a limited time to the patentee in return 
for a full disclosure of all the essential elements of his inven-
tion.112 Upon expiration of the patent the entire claimed dis-
closure is dedicated to the public. The public interest is thus 
reprinted at Z'/ J.P.O.S. 76 (1945); 37 OP. AnY. GEN. 180 (1933); 39 OP. Arn. GEN. 164 
(1938); Ewing, "Government Owned Patents,'' 10 J.P.O.S. 149 (1928); Broder, "Govern-
ment Ownership of Patents,'' 18 J.P.O.S. 697 (1936); Wille, "Government Ownership of 
Patents," 12 FoRD. L. R.Ev. 105 (1943); Kramer, "Exclusive Licenses under Government 
Owned Patents," 28 J.P.O.S. 319 (1946); Boyle, "Exploitation ·of Government Owned 
Patents,'' 35 J.P.O.S. 188 (1953); Forman, "Government Ownership of Patents and the 
Administration Thereof," 28 TEMP. L. Q. 31 (1954); Forman, "United States Patent 
Ownership Policy and Some of its Administrative Implications,'' 38 J.P.O.S. 380, 478, 534, 
647,705,762, 866 (1956), and 39 J.P.O.S. 62 (1957); note, 7 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 249 (1938). 
111 This theory accords with the common law theory of consideration as a bargained-
:for exchange between the parties. The consideration furnished by the inventor is the 
disclosure of his invention " ... in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art .. .'' (35 U.S.C. §112) to understand and practice it. The 
proffered consideration of the inventor in the form of an application for patent is tested 
by examination in the Patent Office for adequacy to make certain that it discloses and 
teaches how to practice a new, useful and meritorious invention and that the exact 
boundaries of the invention are distinctly pointed out to inform the public of the area 
of exclusiveness claimed by the inventor. 35 U.S.C. (1952) §§112, 131. 
112 "By the patent laws Congress has given to the inventor opportunity to receive 
the material rewards for his invention for a limited time, on condition that he make 
full disclosure for the benefit of the public of the manner of making and using the inven-
tion, and that upon the expiration of the patent the public be left free to use the 
inventions. . • . As has been many times pointed out, the means adopted by Congress 
of promoting the progress of science and the arts is the limited grant of the patent 
monopoly in return for the full disclosure of the patented invention and its dedication 
to the public on the expiration of the patent." Chief Justice Stone in Scott Paper Co. 
v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945). 
" .•. [l]t cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States has ever 
been, and continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful inventions, an exclusive 
right in their inventions for the time mentioned in their patent. It is the reward 
stipulated for the advantages derived by the public for the exertions of the individual, 
and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions. The laws which are passed to give 
effect to this purpose ought, we think, to be construed in the spirit in which they have 
been made; and to execute the contract fairly on the part of the United States, where 
lhe full benefit has been actually received: if this can be done without transcending 
the intention of the statute, or' countenancing acts which are fraudulent or may prove 
mischievous. The public yields nothing which it has not agreed to yield; it receives 
all which it has contracted to receive. The full benefit of the discovery, after its enjoy-
ment by the discoverer for fourteen years, is preserved; and for his exclusive enjoyment 
of it during that time the public faith is pledged." Chief Justice Marshall in Grant v. 
Raymond, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 218 at 241-242 (1832). Cf. OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAws 472 (1948). 
"Patent Law as such • . . relates only to the contract character of the patent privi-
lege and forms one branch of the Laws of Contracts. It deals with a single form of 
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served by the effect of the patent system in inducing inventors 
to make full and public disclosures of their inventions instead 
of attempting to protect them through secrecy.113 The gov-
ernment in granting the :r:ight to exclude acts as agent of the 
public. 
When the government acquires title to an invention, the 
legal relationships do not fit the mold of the contract theory. 
The only party in interest is the government itself. It owns 
obligation, and with but two classes of parties whose relations to each other are always 
substantially the same. The principles on which it rests are simple, though often difli• 
cult of application on account of the abstruse or intricate character of the invention 
concerning which the controverted questions rise. These principles may be finally re-
duced to two, as fundamental grounds on which all others rest:-
"!. That the inventor, having made such an invention as is entitled to the patent 
privilege, must communicate it to the public by publishing an accurate description of 
its character and uses; 
"II. That the public having received from the inventor this communication, must 
thenceforth, during the period for which his privilege is granted, protect him in the 
exclusive use of the invention so described." 1 ROBINSON, PATENTS §41 (1890). 
113 "An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, 
but gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowl-
edge. • • • He may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In con-
sideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is 
granted." United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 at 186 (1933). 
" .•• [T]he inventor who designedly, and with the view of applying it indefinitely 
and exclusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from the public comes not 
within the policy or objects of the Constitution or acts of Congress. He does not pro-
mote, and, if aided in his design would impede, the progress of science and the useful 
arts. And with a very bad grace could he appeal for favor or protection to that society 
which, if he had not injured, he certainly had neither benefitted nor intended to bene-
fit." Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 322 at 328 (1858). 
"The patent privilege, if wisely guarded, effects this purpose [to secure the early 
disclosure of inventions to the public]. It removes from the inventor all inducement to 
conceal his discovery, by affording him the same protection that could be obtained by 
the most rigid secrecy. It encourages him to make known his results, as the method of 
securing for himself the largest recompense. It compels him to acquaint the public, 
thoroughly and at the outset, with all the details of his invention and with the various 
modes of benefiting by its use. It appropriates to the whole people, after a short period 
of exclusive ownership by the inventor, the entire invention as a portion of that common 
property in which all men may exercise an equal right." 1 ROBINSON, PATENTS §39 (1890). 
"The first .•• reason for granting patents on invention is to substitute a definite 
and regulated form of monopoly under the law for a broader and entirely unregulated 
one which the patentee might otherwise secure by retaining his secret. Even today 
many manufacturers prefer to rely upon this secrecy in many instances rather than take 
out patents." Hearings Before Senate Committee on Patents, 65th Cong., 3d sess., 12 (1919). 
Cf. remarks of Chief Justice Stone in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 
at 378 (1945): ". • . Congress was aware that an unpatented invention could be sup• 
pressed and the public thus deprived of all knowledge or benefit of it. It could have con-
cluded that the useful arts would be best promoted by compliance with the conditions 
of the statutes which it did enact, which require that patents be granted only for a 
limited term upon an application fully disclosing the invention and the manner of 
making and using it. It thus gave to the inventor limited opportunity to gather material 
rewards for his invention and secured to the public the benefits of full knowledge of 
the invention and the right to use it upon expiration of the patent." 
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the disclosure which it turns over to itself as agent of the pub-
lic in return for the right to exclude which it grants to itself. 
But it is a legal impossibility to have a contract where one party 
purports to contract with itself.114 
Second, under the property theory of patents the point is 
made that acquisition of title to a patent by the authority which 
created it, the federal government, affects a "merger," which 
results in extinguishment of the right to exclude.115 
Although these and other116 arguments asserting the un-
. constitutionality or illegal_ity of government ownership of pat-
ents have been advanced from time to time, the issue has 
perhaps become moot as a result of administrative practice, 
legislative enactments, and judicial dicta or decisions, based 
on an assumption that the practice is lawful. The various de-
partments of the executive branch of the government have been 
acquiring title to patents for well over half a century,117 and 
114 "There must be at least two parties to the making of a contract, that is, one on 
each side, for it is a rule of the common law that no man can contract with himself. 
In its simplest form the rule is a corollary of any definition of contract." 1 WILLISTON, 
CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §18 (1936). "There must be at least two parties in a contract, but 
may be any greater number. • • • It is not possible under existing law for a man to 
make a contract with himself. This rule is one of substance and independent of mere 
procedural requirements." CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §15 (1932). 
115 Analogy is made to the principle of real property that when an estate in fee and 
an easement in the estate are acquired by the same person, the easement is extinguished 
by merger. [Cases are collected in 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §822 (1939).] The 
reasoning by analogy proceeds as follows: " ••• the disclosure by the owner of the 
invention may be considered the dominant estate, and the common law right to make, 
use, and sell a disclosed invention, the servient estate." The patent "is the easement 
enjoyed by the dominant estate, owned by tlie inventor, over the servient estate, owned 
by" the public. When title to the patent is acquired by the government, which is the 
agent of the public, "title to both the dominant and servient estates is • • • in the same 
owner, and the easement disappears." Wille, "Government Ownership of Patents," 12 
FoRD. L. REv. 105 at 112, 25 J.P.O.S. 729 at 737 (1943). This analogy is criticized in Forman, 
"United States Patent Ownership Policy and Some of its Administrative Implications," 
28 J.P.O.S. 380 at 419-420 (1956). The merger principle was apparently applied in an 
English patent case, Re Taylor's Agreement Trusts, [1904] 21 R.P.C. 713; but see .Re 
Dutton's Patent, [1923] 40 R.P.C. 84. 
116 Thomas Ewing, former Commissioner of Patents, contended that the lack of a 
specific delegation of power by the Constitution implied the absence of authority in the 
federal government to exercise the patent monopoly. Ewing, "'Government Owned 
Patents," IO J.P.O.S. 149-151 (1928). Both Wille, supra note 115, and Ewing also set 
forth historical arguments. 
117 In 1881 the Supreme Court noted in passing, "It has been the general practice, 
when inventions have been made which are desirable for Government use, either for 
the Government to purchase them from the inventors, and use them as secrets of the 
proper department; or, if a patent is granted to pay the patentee a fair compensation 
for their use." James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 at 358 (1881). (Emphasis supplied.) 
By 1917, the government owned 122 patents. Remarks of Commissioner of Patents in 
REPORT OF ARMY PATENT CONFERENCE, note 2 supra, at 141 (1955). If a patent is acquired 
by purchase, appropriations must be available. With respect to patents acquired by 
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the annual number of acquisitions has steadily increased in 
recent years.118 A number of statutes enacted through the 
years have expressly or impliedly provided for government ac-
quisition of title to patents and patent applications.119 A re-
cent illustration of this congressional indulgence may be found 
in the 1956 codification of Title 10, United States Code, sec-
tion 2386 of which provides that funds appropriated for a mili-
tary department available for procurement of supplies "may 
be used" to acquire ". . . patents, and applications for pat-
ents."120 The principal judicial sanction121 for the practice is 
donation or agreement, however, no specific statutory authority is necessary. See dis-
cussion of Interdepartmental Patents Board, S. Doc. 83 (68th Cong., 1st sess., 1923) p. I. 
Patents issued to employees under the "no-fee act" (35 U.S.C. §266) may be assigned 
to the government. 37 OP. ATI'Y. GEN. 180 (1933). See also 31 OP. ATI'Y. GEN. 463 (1919); 
32 OP. ATI'Y. GEN. 321 (1920); 34 OP. ATI'Y. GEN. 320 (1924); 38 OP. ATI'Y. GEN. 425, 
534 (1936); 39 OP. Am. GEN. 164 (1938). As a matter of practice in such cases, the 
assignment is often executed prior to filing the application in the Patent Office. 
118 In 1917 the government owned 122 patents, whereas at the beginning of 1955 
the government owned 4,926 patents in force. Of these, 2,057 resulted from inventions 
made by government e.mployees and 2,869 originated from contractors or other sources 
outside the government. Government-owned pending applications totaled 5,573; 1,796 
of these were from government employees, and 3,779 were from outside sources. The 
fact that the number of pending government-owned applications was greater than the 
number of government-owned patents in force, coupled with the fact that in the five 
years immediately prior to 1955 over 600 patents per year were issued to the government, 
gives some indication of the recent tremendous increase in the rate of acquisition of 
government-owned patents. Remarks of the Commissioner of Patents, Hon. Robert C. 
:Watson, Report of Army Patent Conference, note 2 supra, at 141-142 (1955). By April 
1956 the government held an interest (license or assignment) in 23,073 unexpired patents, 
and by December 28, 1956, the government held assignments in 6,579 unexpired patents 
-an increase of 33.6% over the beginning of 1955. (Source: Government Patents Board). 
See also tables set forth in notes 73 and 74 supra. One estimate has predicted 10,000 un-
expired government-owned patents by 1960. Forman, "United States Patent Ownership 
Policy and Some of its Administrative Implications," 38 J.P.O.S. 308 at 402 (1956). 
119 Between 1916 and 1943 at least 30 statutes were passed which made funds avail-
able for the purchase of, or otherwise referred to acquisition of patent rights, 3 REP. 
Am. GEN. 130, n. 9 (1947), and similar statutes were enacted annually for the military 
departments thereafter until 1953 (see note 131 infra). Other statutes which may be 
said to recognize by implication government ownership of patents include pertinent 
sections of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 58, 16 U.S.C. (1952) 
§83ld(i); National Science Foundation Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 149, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1871; 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 921, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §2189; Synthetic Liquid Fuels 
Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 191, 35 U.S.C. (1952) §267. Seizure and sale of enemy-owned patents 
by the Alien Property Custodian were upheld in United States v. Chemical Foundation, 
Inc., 272 U.S. I (1926). As early as 1864 Congress authorized the Court of Claims to 
investigate and rule upon a claim for compensation for use by the United States of 
patented inventions, and directed that if judgment were rendered against the United 
States, " ••• payment of such judgment shall vest the full and absolute right to said 
patents in the United States." Joint Resolution No. 37, June 3, 1864, 13 Stat. 588. 
120 70A Stat. 137 (1956). This section of the law, which became effective on August 
IO, 1956, the day of passage, codified similar provisions which had appeared in annual 
appropriation acts for the military departments until it became permanent legislation 
by §609 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1954, 67 Stat. 350 (1953), 
31 U .S.C. (Supp. IIL 1956) §649b. The latter provision was held by the Comptroller 
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found by negative implication from the Supreme Court's action 
in the Dubilier case, in striking from its opinion a paragraph 
which questioned the authority of the government to hold a 
patent, on motion of the Solicitor General.122 
More persuasive than merely legal objections to a whole-
sale assignment policy by the government which would result 
from the title theory are policy considerations reflecting the 
fundamental purposes and philosophy of the patent system, and 
certain practical objections. 
A well-known basic purpose of the patent system is the en-
couragement of full public disclosures of inventions. As an 
inducement designed to achieve this objective, the patent system 
provides the grant of the right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the invention in the United States for a term 
of seventeen years.123 When the government obtains title to 
inventions on which patents issue, however, the right to exclude is 
not exercised. As a matter of governmental practice infringement 
suits are never instituted124 and, with the exception of certain 
General to provide authority to purchase patent rights as well as to make appropriations 
available for the purpose. 109 U.S.P.Q. 322 (1956). But see 70A Stat. 444 (1956) 10 
u.s.c. §7210. 
121 The courts have ordered assignments of patents or inventions to the government 
in at least three cases involving the respective rights of the government and an employee-
inventor. United States v. Houghton, (D.C. Md. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 434, affd. (4th Cir. 
1928) 23 F. (2d) 386, cert. den. 277 U.S. 592 (1928); Kober v. United States, (4th Cir. 
1948) 170 F. (2d) 590, cert. den. 336 U.S. 945 (1949); United States v. Shook, (6th Cir. 
1956) 238 F. (2d) 952. Another means of accomplishing essentially the same result is an 
injunction against enforcement of the patent, a method used in at least one unreported 
case. 2 REP. ATrY. GEN. 6 (1947). 
122 On May 8, 1933, the Court struck the following passage, which had been included 
in the original opinion, 289 U.S. 178 at 196 (1933), 28 days earlier: 
"Moreover no court could, however, clear the proof of such a contract, order the 
execution of an assignment. No Act of Congress has been called to our attention author-
izing the United States to take a patent or to hold one by assignment. No statutory 
authority exists for the transfer of a patent to any department or officer of the Govern-
ment, or for the administration of patents, or the issuance of licenses on behalf of the 
United States. In these circumstances no public policy requires us to deprive the inventor 
of his exclusive rights as respects the general public and to lodge them in a dead hand 
incapable of turning the patent to account for the benefit of the public." 289 U.S. 706 
(1933). 
A search in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court in October 1956 failed to 
reveal any briefs or other papers in support of the motion to strike. 
"This action of the Supreme Court, in effect, sanctions the assignment of a patent 
to a Government department or officer for the benefit of the Government of the United 
States." 37 OP. ATrY. GEN. 180 at 185 (1933). 
123 35 u.s.c. (1952) §154. 
124 Mr. T. Hayward Brown, Chief, Patents Section, Civil Division, Department of 
Justice, has stated that to his knowledge no infringement suits have been instituted by 
the United States. (Telephone conference with the authors, January 16, 1957). An 
opinion of Attorney General Reed suggested that " •.• should a proper case warranting 
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operations by the Alien Property Custodian125 and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the government has traditionally issued royalty-
free nonexclusive licenses under government-held patents to al-
most all applicants.126 As stated by the Supreme Court in a 
passage struck from the Dubilier opinion, ". . . no public pol-
icy requires us to deprive the inventor of his exclusive rights 
as respects the general public and to lodge them in a dead hand 
incapable of turning the patent to account for the benefit of the 
public."127 Although legislative proposals which would have 
authorized issuance of royalty-bearing exclusive licenses under 
government-owned patents passed each house of Congress but 
did not become law,128 and proposals to exploit government-
such action arise, the Government should undertake to maintain in the courts the ex-
clusive right of the United States under a duly acquired patent." 38 OP. ATIY. GEN. 
425 at 428 (1936). Note that the issue of enforcement might arise if the government's 
domestic royalty-free licensees sought action by the government to prevent importation 
of infringing articles (or articles made by an infringing process), under §337 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 703, 19 U.S.C. (1952) §1337, as supplemented by act of July 
2, 1940, 54 Stat. 724, 19 U.S.C. (1952) §1337a. 
125 During World War II the Alien Property Custodian (whose functions were trans-
ferred to the Attorney General by 1947 Reorg. Plan No. 1, §101, eff. July 1, 1947, 61 
Stat. 951), in administering the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as 
amended, 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §§1-40, 616, vested approximately 50,000 patents and 
patent applications. Although the licensing policy of the Custodian primarily consisted 
of the issuance of nonexclusive, royalty-free licenses, there were three exceptions-(!) 
where vested enemy-owned patents were already exclusively licensed to an American 
licensee; (2) where the patents vested were the property of nationals of enemy-occupied 
countries; and (3) where patents were not vested directly but were owned by corporations 
controlled by the Custodian. In such cases royalties were collected by the Custodian. 
Apparently no infringement suits were instituted. See generally Roe, "War Measures, 
The Alien Property Custodian and Patents," 25 J.P.O.S. 692 (1943); comment, 12 Gm. 
WASH. L. REv. 330 (1944). 
126 The grant of nonexclusive, revocable licenses has been upheld in a series of 
opinions by attorney generals, 31 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 463 at 466 (1919); 34 id. 320 (1924); 
37 id. 180 at 185 (1933); 38 id. 425 (1936); 38 id. 534 (1936). (Unless the license is non-
exclusive and revocable, it may constitute an alienation of property improper without 
legislative authority under Art. 4, §3, cl. 2 of the Constitution). Some agencies require 
the licensee to give a grant-back, to submit a report on its experience or know-how, or 
to submit samples for testing and approval. In the period 1935-1952 a total of 968 
licenses were issued. See generally Forman, "United States Patent Ownership Policy and 
Some of its Administrative Implications," 38 J.P.O.S. 705-712 (1956). 
127 Emphasis added. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 706 (1933), 
quoted in note 122 supra. 
128 In the 66th Congress, these bills were reported favorably by the House and Senate 
Patent Committees (S. Rep. No. 405 on S. 3223 and H. Rep. No. 595 on H.R. 9932). 
The Senate bill passed the Senate on March 22, 1920, but it was not voted on in the 
House; it was then included by the Senate Patents Committee as part of another general 
bill which had already passed the House. The new bill was passed by the Senate on 
June 4, 1920, and by the House with amendments on February 16, 1921, but it did not 
reach a vote again in the Senate because of an objection and the close of Congress. This 
legislative history is reviewed in more detail in 3 REP. A'ITY. GEN. 178-184 (1947). Note 
that identical bills had been reported favorably by the respective Patents Committees in 
the 65th Congress, but failed to come to a vote. Id. at 176-178. However, in the 70th 
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owned patents on a revenue basis have been discussed in the ex-
ecutive branch for many years,129 the government has in the main 
adhered to its royalty-free nonexclusive licensing policy.180 In-
deed, to some· patent attorneys, a patent held by the government 
is in practice not really a patent at all, but more precisely a form 
of technically accurate publication.131 
The government's policy of nonenforcement of the right 
to exclude means that government ownership of patents is also 
objectionable for three practical reasons. First, the normal 
incentive offered by the patent system is inoperative where 
the right to exclude is taken from the inventor without specific 
compensation and is then permitted to lie fallow. Thus dis-
closures may not be forthcoming, to the ultimate disadvantage 
of the public. Second, the procurement of patents by the gov-
ernment, even under a defensive theory,132 constitutes an eco-
nomic waste. The lack of utility of government-owned patents 
has led the present Commissioner of Patents to protest that 
examination of cases filed by the government imposes a need-
less additional work load on an already harried Patent Office 
staff.188 Third, and perhaps most important, the government-
owned patent does not yield the economic benefits intended to 
Congress, a different ·bill, which would have authorized exclusive licensing, passed the 
House, on April 4, 1928; the bill died in the Senate. Id. at 198-200. 
120 E.g., the 1923 Interdepartmental Patents Board (discussed in Part X infra) recom-
mended legislation authorizing exclusive licensing or sale of government-owned patents, 
see 3 REP. AITY. GEN. 192-208 (1947), as did (for certain limited areas) the National 
Patent Planning Commission appointed by President Roosevelt, in its second report, H.R. 
Doc. 22, 79th Cong., 1st sess. 5-8 (1945), reprinted in 27 J.P.O.S. 76 at 83-84 (1945). 
180 For a presentation of arguments in opposition to royalty-free nonexclusive licens-
ing of government-owned patents, see Boyle, "Exploitation of Government-Owned Pat-
ents," 35 J.P.O.S. 188 (1953). Boyle concludes, at 212: 
"li the exclusive right of the Government-owned patent is not to be enforced by the 
Government or disposed of then there is no justification in prosecuting the patent 
application for the purpose of defining the exclusive right. If the Governmental policy 
of royalty free licenses is to be considered as fixed, then the registration system for 
patents which was in effect prior to 1836 would be adequate from the standpoint of 
Government-owned patents." 
131 See Part IX infra. 
132 Ibid. 
138 See note 162 infra. "It is the rising total of Government-owned patents, Govern-
ment-owned applications, which gives me concern. These patents cost money; the Gov-
ernment no doubt pays for the drafting, filing and prosecution, and also pays for the 
examination of the applications from which they mature, that is, the Patent Office cost 
of examination. Each operation costs a substantial sum. After issue, each is licensed 
nonexclusively to anyone who asks for a license. Hence, they are not used as patents 
should be." Remarks of the Commissioner of Patents, Hon. Robert C. Watson, REPORT 
OF .ARMY PATENT CONFERENCE, note 2 supra, at 143. 
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be derived from the patent system, such as the incentive to 
invest speculative risk capital in new and untried concepts, and the 
spurring of competition in research and development. 
VII. Analysis of License Theory 
Supporters of the "license theory" -that the government 
should require from the employee no more than a royalty-free li-
cense regardless of the circumstances of the making of the in-
vention-urge that the government has no need for anything 
more than a royalty-free nonexclusive license to protect itself 
from liability for use of the invention, and that retention of 
patent rights by employees acts as an incentive to keep employees 
in government service and spurs them to inventive activity. In 
addition it is maintained that the license theory affords a uniform 
and unequivocal rule which cannot be expanded and contracted, 
capriciously or otherwise, by administrative or judicial con-
struction and application.134 Finally, it is argued that if there 
are situations in which the government desires to have control 
over use of particular inventions made by employees, it may 
purchase the necessary rights from the inventor.135 
The basic difficulty with the license theory is disregard of 
the double payment proposition as applied to inventions made 
as a direct result of a specific assignment of duty. In these situa-
tions (discussed in Part V above), which are described and de-
limited by the case law,136 it would be unfair to permit enforce-
ment of resulting patent rights to the personal profit of the em-
ployee and at the expense of the public, because in such cases 
the invention was originally paid for, as established by the tradi-
tional judicial standards, by the public. 
134 In 1951 Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary conducted 
hearings on a proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. §1498 to enable a government employee 
to sue the United States in the Court of Claims for patent infringement. This amendment 
in modified form was eventually enacted. See discussion in Part III at note 86 supra. 
In commenting on one proposed version of the amendment which would have barred 
suit by the employee if the patented invention was "related" to his assigned duties at 
the time the invention was made, Captain George N. Robillard USN, Patent Advisor 
to the Secretary of Defense, stated that " .•. very frankly, I as an administrative officer, 
can relate almost any invention to anybody's duties.'' Transcript of Hearings Before 
Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 29 
(1952). 
135 See note 117 supra. 
136 Compare Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924), with United States v. 
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933). 
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VIII. The Middle Ground-Prior Judicial Standards 
Somewhere between the "title" and "license" theories lies the 
system of rules for apportioning rights in employees' inventions 
which was hammered out by the courts in case-by-case formula-
tion over the years. This system has much to commend it. 
A compelling practical advantage is that it represents a fair com-
promise between two extremes; as illustrated by the GPB chair-
man's administration of Executive Order 10096, imposition of an 
extreme by executive fiat is unlikely to yield the results contempla-
ted if there is a legitimate means of escape, because of the natural re-
sistance on the part of those who are required to administer the 
rules. In addition, the system has the advantage of judicial sanc-
tion, and was developed independently of political considerations. 
Of course any rule or standard must be stated as a generality, 
and will be subject to the interpretation of, and application 
by, those responsible for its administration, particularly in the 
somewhat nebulous area of "invention" and the relation of 
invention to job duties; but the specificity and consistency of 
judicial precedents in defining the proper standards provide 
as stable and fair a base as may be devised. 
A policy for determining rights which incorporates prior 
judicial standards would be eminently fair to employees, be-
cause it would take from them only that patent and inventive 
property which, according to the Supreme Court, lawfully be-
longs to the government, and at the same time it would avoid 
the criticism of a "double charge on the public," because the 
employee would be disentitled from prohibiting use of, or ob-
taining revenue from, those inventions which, judged by Supreme 
Court standards, were in legal contemplation paid for by the 
public. 
The sizable category of inventions with respect to which 
the government would require an assignment under the "title" 
theory, but only a license under judicial standards, is the criti-
cal area. In this area, the factor of the public interest should 
be entitled to controlling influence. "Whether the public in-
terest is best served by the dedication of an invention to the 
public or by its exploitation with patent protection under li-
cense from the government or the inventor"137 is an extremely 
difficult question. However, in this area the standards evolved 
137 Stone, J., dissenting, in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 
at 222-223 (1933). 
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by the courts, as opposed to the principles proposed in the At-
torney General's Report, provide opportunity for operation of 
several of the strong public policy factors which support the patent 
system itself; the incentive to invent, the incentive to invest, and 
the incentive to further research. 
A fundamental purpose of the patent system is to provide 
a stimulus to invent through a reward for success in the form 
of patent rights. Invention is painful. It often demands of 
the inventor a tremendous amount of personal effort and self 
sacrifice, and it may entail lavish expenditure of time and money. 
Inventive creations serve the public, but the inventor himself 
must be spurred to accomplishment by the hope of reward. 
The incentive to invent is extremely important to the fed-
eral government, in view of its tremendously increased em-
phasis on research and development in recent years. The rela-
tive difficulty of government as against industry, in providing 
effective stimuli to inventive activity and in attracting and re-
taining able personnel has long been recognized. Recent federal 
employee awards legislation points up the need and has improved 
the situation somewhat, but the awards program is an inade-
quate answer.138 Of course the proposition has limitations-
the public interest in establishing incentive is not so strong as 
to override the rule of Standard Parts v. Peck139 that inventions 
138 Awards made under existing awards legislation, the Government Employees In-
centive Awards Act, 68 Stat. 1112, 5 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) §§2121-2123 (which became 
law September I, 1954), and its predecessors, have traditionally been small. The 1954 act 
places a $5,000 limit on departmental awards in the absence of Civil Service Commission 
approval, and lumps inventions with meritorious suggestions, superior accomplishments, 
and personal efforts. A recipient of a cash award is required to waive any claim 
(apparently including patent infringement or royalty claims) against the government. 
Cash awards may be made only to civilian employees. In addition, it is generally im-
possible to determine the importance or cash value of an invention at the time it is 
made. As applied to inventions, the awards program is not entirely dissimilar to the 
ex gratia awards system used to reward employee-inventors by the British and Russian 
governments, as described in Johnson, "Encouraging Employees to Invent," 13 Moo. L. 
REv. 428 (1950), which states in conclusion, at 444, that if the patent system should be 
abandoned or abolished, " ... the need for an alternative yet remains. At present every-
thing points to the cash award as the natural alternative in all three [Britain, U.S., 
and U.S.S.R.) countries. The cash award, however, may prove no less contentious than 
the patent. . . • [T)he policy of the cash award still does not meet the difficulty that 
modem research is nearly always organized on a group basis. It may be that the collec-
tive reward to a whole laboratory, already provided for under the Soviet law, will prove 
the answer to this problem." 
139 264 U.S. 52 (1924). "The primary reason ••. that the War Department has 
acquired legal title to those patents which it now owns has not been based upon the fact 
that the acquisition of title was not necessary to its operations, but that as between itself 
and the inventor, it, that is the Government, had a paramount right to such title and 
would therefore claim it to prevent the inventor from asserting his right of exclusion 
against the general public and in this way force the payment of tribute to him in the 
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resulting from specific assignments of duty belong to the em-
ployer; that is, stated · from policy viewpoint, this interest is not 
so strong as to justify infringement or royalty payments by the 
public where the public has already paid for the making of the 
invention. Subject to this limitation, however, stimulus to in-
vent can best be provided by application of judicial standards. 
Refusal to leave commercial rights with the employee dampens 
incentive,140 and makes continued government service far less 
attractive. The comments of numerous government employees 
both before and after issuance of publication of the strict criteria 
of Executive Order 10096 substantiated this fear. 
It is difficult to gather evidence of the presence, or absence, 
of this incentive factor. However, an example may illustrate 
its value in a specific case. One of the government's most out-
standing scientists, Dr. Robert M. Page, who made some of the 
basic inventions in radar and who owns commercial rights in 
the patents covering his inventions, early in his career turned 
down an industrial offer which included great opportunities for 
future advancement and would have paid him almost twice his 
form of royalties to which he would not otherwise be entitled." Hearings Before the 
House Committee on Patents, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 12 (1946) . 
.140 Prior to issuance of Executive Order 10096 the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory 
had a policy of permitting its inventors to retain the commercial rights to their inven-
tions whenever possible. After issuance of the order NRL policies were, of course, limited 
by . the terms of the order. The following table tends to show that the number of 
reported invention disclosures dropped off very significantly once the impact of the 
order was felt (1950 and later). The figures are even more startling in view of the 
fact that, because of the Korean War, in the years commencing with 1950 the number 
of scientific personnel employed by the laboratory and the amount of available funds 
were materially increased over those for the years 1947, 1948 and 1949. Thus, between 
December 1949 and December 1952 the number of scientific personnel employed by the 
laboratory jumped approximately 25%. 
This table indicates a high degree of correlation between the incentive to make 
and report inventions and policies governing retention of commercial rights. A strict 
policy dampens incentive. 
Number of Invention 











Source: Records of Patent Branch, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory. 
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government salary at the start. The primary reason for his re-
fusal was that the policy of the Navy Department in permitting 
him to retain commercial rights in his inventions whenever pos-
sible compensated for the disparity between the salaries.141 Even 
from a mercenary point of view, the government's interest in the 
inventions later made by Dr. Page probably avoided vast royalty 
payments. As illustrative of the opinion of able inventors employed 
by the government, this scientist's reaction to the proposals out-
lined in the 1947 Attorney General's Report merits quotation: 
"Government inventors will not file patent applications 
without strong incentives. The preparation of patent dis-
closures, the legal red tape that goes with making patent appli-
cations, and the nature of the controversies involved in patent 
interferences are in themselves distasteful to the average engi-
neer. In addition, they are particularly annoying when they 
take his time away from the technical work in which he is 
primarily interested. In commercial companies the initiative 
is taken by legal engineers in seeking out patentable material 
in the laboratories and taking steps to protect the company's 
interest in such matters. Such a process appears to be in-
feasible at NRL [Naval Research Laboratory] because of the 
141 At the time that Dr. Page turned down this very favorable offer from a large 
and established corporation and in the years prior to the issuance of Executive Order 
10096 the Navy followed a policy of permitting employee inventors to retain commercial 
rights to their inventions whenever possible under its existing regulations. A typical 
Navy regulation in the field of invention rights which was in force without substantive 
change during the period from 1929 to the issuance of the executive order is set forth 
in 2 REP. ATIY. GEN. 320-322 (1947).' In the Hearings on Science Legislation at the 
close of World War II, Rear Admiral Harold G. Bowen, Chief of the Navy's Office of 
Research and Invention, testified as follows: " ..• In all of these cases where the Govern-
ment employees are involved, we have allowed them, as a rule, their commercial rights. 
We have done that as an incentive. The people in the Government service can't expect 
to get the same rates of pay paid in industry, and this acts as an incentive. I have been 
told that the Naval Research Laboratory, which operates under that system, submits far 
more patent disclosures than other Government laboratories where what I call the 
incentive system is not established." Hearings on Science Legislation Before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pt. I, 250-251 
(1945). 
In his letter in reply to the offer from industry, Dr. Page stated: "I am in doubt 
as to the expediency of a change in my connections at the present time inasmuch as 
the working and living conditions here are very much to my liking. Although my pres-
ent salary is rather low it represents only a part of my income as I retain the com-
mercial rights on all my inventions." [The letter is quoted here with Dr. Page's per-
mission.] 
Dr. Page's refusal of this and other lucrative commercial offers over the years has 
undoubtedly resulted in great savings to the government, and through it, to the tax-
payers. The fact that the government holds licenses under Dr. Page's patents covering 
many of the basic inventions in radar enabled it to avoid royalty payments which it 
othenvise would have had to pay. Government procurement of radar devices amounted 
to billions of dollars in World War II alone. Even a very low royalty rate on this amount 
of procurement would yield vast sums. 
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tremendously expanded legal department that would be re-
quired to perform this function. If the Government's inter-
ests, and therefore, the people's interests, are to be protected, 
some alternate provision is necessary to get the engineers to 
file patent applications. Present Navy policy in this regard 
provides in part the necessary incentive. Even with this policy 
it is still necessary to stimulate by direct action the keeping 
of proper legal records and the filing of important patent 
applications. 
"Present policy is an important factor in attracting and 
holding a certain type of scientist. This writer testifies that 
were it not for the hope, through commercial rights on pat-
ents, of filling the gap between his Government salary and 
the average value of his many commercial offers, he woulq. 
never bother to file patent applications for the Navy. The 
use of other pressures to force filing of patent applications 
would only serve to make commercial offers appear even 
more attractive. "142 
Statements of similar purport have been made by other govern-
ment scientists.143 
142 Part II, ARMED SERVICES PATENT POLICY R.Evmw BOARD REPORT 31-32 (1952). 
This report constituted a thorough study of military patent policies in effect in and 
before 1952. The board was comprised of the Judge Advocates General of the Army 
and Air Force, _and the Chief of Naval Research (chairman). A copy of Part II of the 
report, dealing with employee (as distinguished from contractor) rights in inventions, 
is on file in the library of the University of Michigan Law School. 
,143After the issuance of Executive Order 10096 (which, if strictly applied, would 
have imposed the stringent "title policy" recommended by the Attorney General's Report 
on all employees of executive agencies), the following statements were made by various 
government scientists in response to questions concerning the effect of the expected loss 
of commercial rights on the incentive to invent: 
"It is an accepted fact that salaries in Government scientific work are less than 
corresponding salaries in industry by a factor of ¾ to ½. The other circumstances sur-
rounding Government employment, such as prestige, leave privileges, retirement, etc., are 
at the present time only slightly more advantageous than those offered in industry and 
are steadily becoming less attractive as Congress whittles away privileges of Government 
, workers and as industry adopts more liberal policies. Consequently, a liberal patent 
policy might be a deciding factor in recruiting new employees and retaining old em-
ployees, particularly with respect to employees with inventive talent." (Emphasis added.) 
FINAL REPORT, Part II, ARMED SERVICES PATENT POLICY ~JEW :BOARD 33 (1952). 
"Keeping adequate records for patent purposes, preparing disclosure records and 
aiding patent personnel in the prosecution of applications is a chore for scientists which 
requires a certain amount of extra effort. Without any individual stimulus, employees 
have relaxed their efforts to record inventiqns. Issuance of a patent in his name in the 
remote future does not counterbalance human inertia and certainly does not generate 
an aggressive attitude toward reporting inventions. While in some fields patent personnel 
may be able to recognize potential invention by inspection of records, logs, and the like, 
such solution is generally not practical because of the enormous output and swift develop-
ment in research activities. The cooperation of the inventor is essential." (Emphasis 
added.) Id. at 34. 
". . . In industry an individual with vision and ability is compensated by increased 
salary or bonus or even a percentage of royalties. In Government, as of now, an indi-
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· In recent years, with the rise of research on a corporate or 
organizational basis, and with the increasing crowding and com-
petitive struggle within various areas of technology, the courts have 
emphasized another desideratum of the patent system-investment 
incentive. After an invention is conceived it generally requires 
much additional development before it is ready for market or 
industrial use. In order to attract investment capital for these pur-
poses, the developer must be assured of some protection, at the 
outset, against immediate competition which would destroy the 
advantages flowing from the investment. The patent system is, 
or should be, well adapted to this purpose; as Judge Jerome Frank. 
stated in another context in a famous concurring opinion, " . . . 
there still seems to be room for some kind of patent monopoly 
which, through hope of rewards to be gained through such a 
monopoly, will induce venturesome investors to risk large sums 
needed to bring to the commercially useful stage those new ideas 
which require immense expenditure for that purpose. "144 This 
vidual receives no added remuneration for a patentable idea or process. It is recognized 
that the Government should be entitled to a royalty-free license on patents developed 
by Government employees but the employees should have an option to develop the 
commercial aspects of the invention without prejudice to his [sic] position." Id. at 37. 
"I was approached by several organizations with offers of what then appeared to be 
fabulous salaries, but what interested me most was NRL which offered no net increase 
in salary, but rather the opportunity to procure commercial rights to my inventions and 
the opportunity to do basic work in the field of magnetic amplifications. I joined NRL 
as a Unit Head ..• in September 1949. 
"In the two years since joining NRL, I have led first a unit, and then a Section 
which has consisted for most of the time of only two men besides myself. My work has 
resulted to date in eight patent disclosures on new and improved circuitry and a new 
'theoretical approach to solutions of magnetic amplifier problems. . • . 
"This [issuance of Executive Order 10096] has called for a re-evaluation of my posi-
tion here. I have found that it is no longer to my advantage to remain at NRL and I 
am now examining some positions in private industry which prove more remunerative 
for my special talents. I can say, quite frankly, that the offers I am receiving from well 
established and stable organizations make my present salary look quite small. Since com-
parisons can now be made only on the basis of salary I seem to have no choice." (Em-
phasis added.) Id. at 37-38. 
"To operate effectively, our laboratory absolutely must be able to compete with 
private industry, for competent physicists and engineers, particularly at the top levels. 
It is a sober fact that industry is offering $2,000 more per year than the Government for 
men with a Master's degree in servomechanisms and no experience. For experienced men 
that differential is greater. In two years of searching our section has not succeeded in 
hiring a single man of either category. In that period, industry has siphoned off key 
personnel throughout the laboratory. There was a time when skilled, aggressive people 
could be attracted because they were willing to gamble on an immediate salary loss, 
confidently expecting commercial patent rights for their outstanding contributions. Ex-
ecutive Order 10096 leaves us totally unable to compete for personnel in fields which 
parallel the needs of industry. Still worse, we are threatened with the loss of key per-
sonnel who feel the order was a breach of contract.'' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 39-40. 
144 Concurring opinion in Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 
632 at 642, cert. den. 317 U.S. 651 (1942). 
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objective of the patent system cannot be realized if the govern-
ment acquires title to patents, because the government has neither 
the facilities or interest to indulge in production activities,145 nor 
the interest or willingness to grant exclusive licenses protecting 
an investor. On the other hand, if the employee retains commercial 
rights and grants the government a royalty-free nonexclusive 
license; the government's interests are protected, and in addition 
the investment incentive objective of the patent system has an 
opportunity to operate, because the employee is able to interest 
manufacturing concerns in the invention; in this way, the in-
vention stands a much better chance of being placed into actual 
operation, to the benefit of the public. 
It is occasionally maintained that employees who retain com-
mercial rights will naturally tend to sell them to dominant con-
cerns in the particular industry, which will, be able to make the 
most attractive proposals, and that this practice will be one mpre 
device facilitating concentration of economic power in the hands 
of a few corporate giants. Although the premise is suspect, even 
assuming its accuracy arguendo,, the obvious point is that the anti-
trust laws provide powerful sanctions against excessive economic 
concentration; further, the fact that some employees might sell 
their patent rights to large companies is no basis for destroying 
entirely the opportunity of all employees to realize a reward for 
their inventive efforts in accordance with their own choice of 
assignee or exclusive licensee. 
Finally, industrial elements may resent federal employee owner-
ship of patent rights, if they do not rely upon their own patent 
position or have reason to apprehend enforcement of particular 
patents held by government employees. These interests may even 
support the "title theory" proposed in the 194 7 report of the At-
torney General. However, it is likely that a contrary position 
would be taken by another segment of industry; and it is doubtful 
whether, many industrial proponents of the "title theory" would 
145 "Frequently inventions that are developed require additional work before they 
are made available for industrial uses. They tell me in the scientific bureaus that they 
feel they are not at liberty without some authorization by Congress to go ahead with a 
line of investigation after they have reached the point where it is of use or ceases to 
be of use to the Government, however useful it might be in industry. 
"The Bureau of Chemistry, for instance, when we were threatened a year or so 
ago with a shortage of dyes, developed a great deal of material over there which they still 
have and which is not being made useful to anybody because the dye situation has been 
relieved by the licensing under German patents. Now, in the nitrate plants they got an 
enormous amount of oxygen as a by-product after they had taken the nitrogen out of 
the air. There are many commercial uses to which that can be put, but they say the 
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favor an across-the-board application of the theory to embrace 
government research and development contracts as well as the field 
of inventive employment.146 
Another factor in favor of permitting employees to retain 
commercial rights in a maximum number of cases is that such 
a policy tends to support the normal operation of the patent system 
in providing the bundle of incentives and benefits derived from 
the "working patent." If a government inventor licenses a com-
mercial firm to practice his patented invention, the patent is 
permitted to function in its proper way as envisioned in the Con-
stitution and by Congress. The working patent injects a new 
product, machine, process, or chemical composition into the econ-
omy, and, if commercially successful, it places the licensee in a 
competitively advantageous position. The success of the new in-
vention stimulates unlicensed competitors to further their research 
programs to create still new and better inventions to meet the com-
petition. The cycle continuously repeats itself; competition in 
research is stimulated and the public benefits as new inventions 
reach the market place and the broad base of technology expands. 
The working patent thus "makes the pot boil," creates new jobs, 
and extends the horizons of research.147 
Government is not authorized to go ahead; that it is not in the oxygen business. No 
private individual is going to put money into this thing for additional development 
unless he can get some measure of protection." Hearings Before the Committee on Pat-
ents of the Senate, 65th Cong., 3d sess., 7 (1919). 
146 The military departments require the contractor in research and development 
contracting to grant the government a royalty-free, nonexclusive, worldwide license in 
inventions developed under the contract, with title remaining in the contractor. How-
ever, if the contractor elects not to seek patent protection on a certain invention, he is. 
required to grant title to the government, reserving a royalty-free, nonexclusive, license. 
Paragraph 9-107.I, Armed Services Procurement Regulation, 32c. F.R. §9-107-1 (1956 
Supp.). The Attorney General recently suggested that this policy may be a factor tending 
to concentrate economic power excessively in a few large government rontractors, and 
that a re-evaluation of the policy might be desirable. Report of Attorney General (to 
the President and Congress) pursuant to Section 708 (e) of the Defense Production Act 
of 1950, as amended (1956). 
147 "A patent, to be effective to the greatest extent in advancing the useful arts, should 
be in the hands of one who is manufacturing the article covered. He is supplying the 
public with the needed thing; he is creating jobs; increasing the prosperity of the area 
in which his plant is located. He is also asserting his patent against infringers and in 
so doing, stimulates them and other actual and prospective competitors into actively 
looking toward production of something different, even something better, which is of 
competitive character, but is without the scope of the patent. This stimulation of 
rompetitive research is one of the most important functions of the patent. Patents held 
by the Government do not perform these several useful functions .... " Remarks of the 
Commissioner of Patents, Hon. Robert C. Watson, REPORT OF ARMY PATENT CONFERENCE, 
note 2 supra, at 143. 
James T. Newton, former Commissioner of Patents has stated: "One of the main 
benefits of a patent is that it gives the manufacturer a monopoly at the beginning of the 
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Additional benefits of the working patent are that it gets new 
ideas before the public in concrete form; and ideas beget ideas. 
It enables small businesses to receive an assured return, a portion 
of which may be devoted to further research, and makes it pos-
sible for them to use new inventions to compete in markets other-
wise restricted to larger companies. 
To those who question the fundamentals of the patent sys-
tem,148 government ownership of inventions, which in practice 
amounts to public dedication, seems a salutary policy. However, 
dedication prevents operation of the strong public policy factors 
which underlie the constitutionally created monopoly of the patent 
grant. Without the patent the incentives to invent and invest 
and the benefits furnished by the working patent are lost to the 
public. The continuing vitality of the patent system as evidenced 
and reinforced by the 1952 Codification Act149 and the history of 
judicial decisions over the past quarter century150 demonstrates 
working or operation -of the thing patented. You gentlemen must give consideration to 
the fact that when an invention comes into the world it is like a newborn baby; nobody 
wants it particularly; nobody thinks much of it, and the new thing has got to be developed. 
And if you take out a patent and throw it out to the public, it destroys the· value of 
that patent, because no manufacturer wants to take an invention, undeveloped, and run 
the risk of making a market for it and then have somebody else come in and cut off 
all of his profits. And the value of the patent is right there; it enables the manufacturer 
to get an industry started. That is the value to the public, too. After the industry is 
started and the public gets the benefit of the invention, then the patent is beginning 
to perform the function that the framers of the Constitution intended it should perform, 
in making work easier for the general public, in giving them something they never had 
before and something that they wanted. 
"To simply patent a thing and throw it into the world is a miscarriage of the 
functions that the patent ought to have, and it destroys the value of the patent not 
only to the inventor but to the public generally; because nobody would take up and 
develop the invention." Hearings Before Senate and House Committees on Patents, 66th 
Cong., 1st sess., 16 (1919). See also Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents, 
79th Cong., 2d sess., 7 (1946). 
148 One writer has referred to this group as "the restrictionists" because they favor 
a general narrowing of the area in which exclusive rights granted for inventive creations 
will be upheld. Oppenheim, "The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and 
Intellectual Property," 32 J.P.O.S. 903, 905 (1950). Representative expressions of the 
restrictionist viewpoint are set forth in the following: Hamilton, "Patents and Free 
Enterprise," TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 31 (1941); Feuer, "The Patent Privilege and the 
TNEC Proposals,'' 14 TEMP. L. Q. 180 (1940); Petro, "Patents: Judicial Developments 
and Legislative Proposals," 12 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 80, 352 (1944-45); Hamilton and Till, 
"What is a Patent?" 13 I.Aw & CoNTEM. PROB. 246 (1948); Kahn, "Fundamental Defi-
ciencies of the American Patent Law,'' 30 AM. ECON. REv. 475 (1940); GILFILLAN, THE 
SocIOLOGY OF INVENTION (1935); Gilfillan, "Social Principles of Invention," 17 J.P.O.S. 
216 (1935); Watkins and Stocking, "Patent Monopolies and Free Enterprise," 3 VAND. 
L. REv. 729 (1950). 
149 35 u.s.c. (1952) §§1-293. 
150 "Despite some striking attempts to cut out the heart of patent rights, there is 
no substantial evidence of a drift away from judicial protection of the 'hard core' of 
the patent grant. This conclusion may surprise the reader at first because a few dramatic 
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that Congress and the courts have not departed from the view that 
the legal protection of inventive ideas has been worth more to 
society than it has cost.151 
IX. Defensive Protection Without Government Patenting 
In view of the foregoing, it is proposed (in Part XI below) that 
a policy structure for determining rights in employees' inventions 
based on judicial standards is the optimum, and that Congress 
should take action to codify such a policy. The policy for de-
termining rights is not quite enough, however. It alleviates the 
deviations from traditional safeguards of patent rights, or judicial dicta, may have 
deflected attention from the march of decisional law and the facts of particular cases. 
A dispassionate examination of judicial trends since the 1930's will disclose few breaches 
in patent law policy. In this appraisal we must exclude every adjudicated case where 
the court found genuine patent misuse or antitrust abuse, since these do not shrink the 
legitimate sphere of lawful patent rights." Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust: Peace-
ful Coexistence?" 54 MICH. L. REv. 199 at 203 (1955). 
151 The National Patent Planning Commission, appointed by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt with Charles F. Kettering as its chairman pursuant to Executive Order No. 
8977, December 12, 1941, 3 C.F.R. 316 (Supp. 1941), made the following statement in its 
initial report which was transmitted by the President to Congress on June 18, 1943: 
"The American patent system established by the Constitution giving Congress the 
'power to promote the progress of science and useful arts,' is over 150 years old. The 
system has accomplished all that the framers of the Constitution intended. It is the only 
provision of the Government for the promotion of invention and discovery and is the 
basis upon which our entire industrial civilization rests. 
"The American people and their Government should recognize the fundamental 
rightness and fairness of protecting the creations of its inventors by the patent grant. 
The basic principles of the present system should be preserved. The system has con-
tributed to the growth and greatness of our Nation; it has-
" (1) Encouraged and rewarded inventiveness and creativeness, producing new prod-
ucts and processes which have placed the United States far ahead of other countries in 
the field of scientific and technological endeavor; 
"(2) Stimulated American inventors to originate a major portion of the important 
industrial and basic inventions of the past 150 years; 
" (3) Facilitat~d the rapid development and general application of new discoveries 
in the United States to an extent exceeding that of any other country; 
"(4) Contributed to the achievement of the highest standard of living that any 
nation has ever enjoyed; 
" (5) Stimulated creation and development of products and processes necessary to 
arm the Nation and to wage successful war; 
" (6) Contributed to the improvement of the public health and the public safety; and 
" (7) Operated to protect the individual and small business cone.ems during the 
formative period of a new enterprise. 
"The strongest industrial nations have the most effective patent systems and after 
a careful study, the Commission has reached the conclusion that the American system is 
the best in the world." H.R. Doc. 239, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1 (1943). 
In its summary of findings and recommendations the co1PIDission further stated: 
"The patent system is the foundation of American enterprise and has demonstrated its 
value over a period coextensive with the life of our Government. The principle of recog-
nizing a property right in intellectual creation is sound and should be continued as 
contemplated in the Constitution." Id. at 9. But see note 184 infra. 
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anomalous situation resulting from sterile government owner-
ship of patents, by limiting the area in which the government 
requires assignment of title to the minimum consistent with fair-
ness and equity, but even within this minimal area progress would 
be made if a further proposal were enacted into law, 
The government's primary interest in obtaining patents cov-. 
ering inventions in which it owns full title is defensive. The de-
fensive theory justifying the patenting of government-owned in-
ventions is founded on the idea that a government-owned patent 
offers the best possible means of protection to the government in 
avoiding or defending against claims of patent infringement.162 
The government has relaxed its sovereign immunity in the realm 
of patents to permit institution of patent infringement suits in 
the Court of Claims,153 and presentation by private persons of 
administrative claims154 alleging infringement by the government. 
Advocates of government ownership maintain that a government-
owned patent provides the best possible defense to infringement 
claims for several reasons. The obtaining of a patent is said to 
avoid the costly procedures of tracking down records and wit-
nesses to prove priority of invention as a defense against claims 
arising years after an invention is made, as well as to avoid the 
danger of complete loss of some essential proofs through death of 
witnesses and loss or destruction of records. Mere publication 
of government-owned invention disclosures is asserted to be in-
adequate for protection because a publication is only effective 
as an anticipatory reference from the date of its publication to 
prevent another from obtaining a patent on the same invention,1115 
and a private party who actually makes his invention after the 
government inventor but prior to the publication date would be 
able to obtain a patent if he filed within one year of the publica-
tion date.1116 The publication alone thus furnishes the government 
no means of provoking an interference in the Patent Office to 
prove priority of invention over a private party who makes the 
invention in the interim period between invention by a govern-
ment employee and publication. Further, publication may not 
be possible if the subject matter of the invention is classified, but 
152 The defensive theory of government patenting is best presented in Saragovitz, 
"Procurement of Patents by Government Agencies," 37 J.P.O.S. 677 (1955). See also 
Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 56-57 (1946). 
153Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 941, as amended, 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1498. 
15410 u.s.c (1956) §2386. 
155 35 U.S.C. (1952) §102 (a). 
156 Id., §102 (b). 
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when a patent application· is filed the subject matter may be kept 
in secrecy for an indefinite period without loss of rights under 
the provisions of the Inventions Secrecy Act.157 
The proposed legislation codifying a policy for determining 
rights (see Part XI below) should be complemented by a means 
which ~ssures that the government's defensive interests in the 
inventions which it owns are protected but which at the same 
time avoids the waste attendant to prosecution and examina-
tion of patent applications and the issuance and free licensing 
of patents. To accomplish this purpose, a complete legislative 
program should include provisions which would amend the 
Patent Code to provide that examination and prosecution of gov-
ernment-owned applications could be suspended at the time of 
filing (or possibly later in some cases) upon order of the com-
missioner at the request of the government and that such ap-
plications could be printed and published at a time selected 
by the government.158 The application as filed would be no 
different from any other application.159 A provision should be 
included which would make it possible for the Patent Office to 
declare an interference between a published government-owned 
application and a later-filed application of a private party for a 
period of one year from the publication date of the government-
owned application.160 The published application would thus 
157 Id., §§181-188. _ 
158 A similar proposal was made during the 1951 Hearings on the codification and 
revision of the patent laws. This proposal was to add the following paragraph (which 
had been included in H.R. 9133, 81st Cong.) to section 122 of H.R. 3760: "Pending appli-
cations for patents may be printed and published by the Commissioner, at the request 
and expense of the applicant and owner. Such publication shall have the same effect 
as an issued patent for the purposes of section 102 (e) of this title." Hearings Before 
Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st sess., ser. 9, 
p. 79 (1951). 
159 It is contemplated that this provision would relieve the examiner from making 
any close study of the government-owned application and from making a prior art 
search, except in those cases, few in number, in which an application or patent of a 
private party is found to interfere with the subject matter claimed in a government-
owned application. The government could normally refrain from publishing the appli-
cation as filed until a reasonable time had elapsed; the purpose of the delay would be to 
allow time in which an interference might be provoked. 
160 After one year from publication the government-owned application as a printed 
publication would be a statutory bar as to all that it disclosed against the subsequent 
filing of a patent application by another. 35 U.S.C. (1952) §102 (b). For this provision 
to be fully effective, however, it would be necessary to amend §135 of the Patent Code 
to provide that a claim for the same subject matter as a claim of a published govern-
ment-owned application may not be made in any application unless it is made within 
one year of publication of the government-owned application. Section 135 now provides 
that "a claim which is the same as, or for the same or substantially the same subject 
matter as, a claim of an issued patent may not be made in any application unless such 
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remain pro tanto an application for purposes of permitting de-
claration of an interference between the published applica-
tion and a later-filed application of another claiming the same 
subject matter.161 Provisions enacting these proposals would succeed 
in removing one of the most serious objections to government 
ownership of patents by relieving the Patent Office examining 
corps of the burden of examining government-owned applications, 
without sacrificing the defensive benefits which accrue to the 
government through filing of patent applications on government-
owned inventions.162 
X. Need for Legislation 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the subject of the 
rights of federal employees in their inventions is complex, and 
has been debated for many years. It is a problem which involves 
a claim is made prior to one year from the date on which the patent was granted." 
35 u.s.c. (1952) §135. 
161 The Patents Act of Great Britain has a provision which enables the government 
to protect its defensive interests in inventions which it owns without the necessity of 
obtaining .patents. "(1) ... any Government department ... may make, us~ and 
exercise any patented invention for the services of the Crown. • • • (2) If ••• the inven• 
tion has before the priority date of the relevant claim of the complete specification 
been duly recorded by ..• or on behalf of a Government department ..• free of any 
royalty or other payment to the patentee," provided the invention which was recorded 
did not reach the government through the patentee. Sections 46 (1) and 46 (2), Patents 
Act, 1949. The existence of a prior Crown record thus does not act as an anticipatory 
referen_ce or bar the obtaining of a patent by another but merely relieves the government 
from any liability for infringement. Under the objectives of the American patent system, 
however, it is believed to be more desirable to publish and dedicate to the public inven-
tions owned by the government, than to bury them in a government file as a defense 
available to the government alone. 
162 In March 1955, the government owned 0.8% of the total number of patents in 
force, but it owned 2½% of the total number of pending applications. The burden 
placed on the Patent Office by government-owned applications is thus increasing appre-
ciably. Remarks of the Commissioner of Patents, Hon. Robert C. Watson, REPORT OF 
ARMY PATENT CONFERENCE, note 2 supra, at 142. In commenting on the patenting of 
government-owned inventions, the commissioner stated, at 143: 
"Patents held by the Government . . • serve to safeguard the defensive position 
of the Government against the claims of late-comer patentees. The question is, there-
fore, cannot some substitute be found for the defensive patent, which substitute costs 
less to bring into being and which doesn't have to be sent to the Patent Office for 
processing. We are having a tough time in the Patent Office, as many of you perhaps 
know; we are greatly understaffed. We need 150 more examiners there today just to 
keep abreast of the inflow of new cases, not to mention to try to reduce the enormous 
backlog of 210,000 applications we have pending. We are falling behind day by day, 
now in the neighborhood of over a thousand applications a month, and some of those 
applications are quite large in size, covering very complicated and complex inventions, 
much more so now than formerly. Much thought has been given to this circumstance, I 
am aware-it's not at all a new problem which I have mentioned, and I know that 
many have worked on it. I just ask you to take it under consideration and see if the 
problem can't be licked." 
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the interplay of many legal and policy considerations; adherents 
may be found for many positions within an extensive range. This 
reason alone stamps the problem as a legislative one; it is not 
a field in which the fundamental policies should be promul-
gated by the judicial or executive branches of the government. 
The need for legislation is particularly clear in view of the 
Supreme Court's dicta in the Dubilier case commenting on the 
fact that the Court was not called upon to decide whether gov-
ernment departments had "power to impose such a contract 
[requiring assignment of inventions] upon employees without 
authorization by act of Congress."163 There has been substantial 
consensus through the years, the Attorney General's Report ex-
cepted, that the subject matter should be covered by legislation. 
The desirability of legislative resolution of the problem has 
become increasingly evident since promulgation of Executive 
Order I 0096. The uneasy feeling of many government patent and 
scientific personnel that an administrative or executive regulation, 
even if purportedly justified as a condition of employment, is of 
doubtful validity1 64 leaves substantial questions of title and license 
beclouded.165 Although the Attorney General's Report sought 
163 289 U.S. 178 at 208 (1933). For discussion of the effect of the disparity of bargain-
ing power between inventors and their employers, see CoSTA, LAw OF INVENTING IN EM-
PLOYMENT 8, 77 (1953). Cf. note, 40 HARV. L. REv. 1000 (1927). 
164 Three lower court opinions have upheld administrative regulation contracts 
required by the government. Selden Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., (W.D. 
N.Y. 1930) 48 F. (2d) 270; Kober v. United States, (4th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 590, cert. 
den. 336 U.S. 945 (1949); Shook v. United States, (6th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 952. [A 
contract similar to that involved in the Kober case was mentioned in passing in Fox 
v. Kingsland, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 433, affd. sub nom. Marzan v. Fox, (D.C. Cir. 
1950) 180 F. (2d) 45]. However, in the Selden case the court considered the regulation 
to be consistent with the act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 625; in the Kober case, the court 
noted that the result would have been the same even if the regulation were invalid for 
want of statutory authority; and in the Shook case the court held alternatively that 
Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924) was controlling. Thus there has been 
no square ruling on the point. 
165 Ordinarily it is no defense in an infringement action by a government employee 
against a private party to show that equitable title is in the government. Hazeltine Corp. 
v. Electric Service Engineering Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 18 F. (2d) 662 at 668 ("Whatever 
rights the United States Government may have in the invention, growing out of the 
inventor's employment, the patent was issued in his name and his assignees hold the full 
legal title, which must be recognized in a court of equity until superior equities are 
asserted"); Yablick v. Protecto Safety Appliance Corp., (3d Cir. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 885; 
Dubilier Condenser Corp. v. Radio Corporation of America, (D.C. Del. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 
450, revd. on other grounds (3d Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 305, 309, cert. den. 287 U.S. 
648, 650 (1932). Cf. Kwai, "Patents to Government Employees," 13 J.P.O.S. 387 at 390-
394 (1931). Of course, the defense would probably be good if legal title was in the 
United States, as evidenced by a recorded assignment or one suitable for recording. 
For an illustrative case involving private employment in which rights to an inven-
tion were determined by means of a suit brought by an employee to disperse cloud on 
title, see Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., (3d Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 215. 
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to establish by argument that the executive branch does have 
authority in this field to issue regulations which have the force of 
law,166 the Supreme Court's powerful dictum that "any such 
declaration of policy must come from Congress and ... no power 
to declare it is vested in administrative officers"167 has kept the 
issue open. A recent decision of the Comptroller General168 indi-
cates that the question whether the government is entitled to a 
nonexclusive license or no interest at all in a given invention re-
mains open after a ruling on the point adverse to the government 
under Executive Order 10096, if the latter ruling is interpreted 
as in conflict with the employee disability provisions set forth in 
28 U.S.C. §1498. This decision creates further doubts as to the 
efficacy of administrative regulations in this field unsupported by 
congressional sanction. To the extent that any executive policy 
(whether by contract, executive order, or regulation) for deter-
mining rights in federal employees' inventions conflicts with the 
substantive criteria established by case law, it will run into the 
serious question of lack of statutory authority which was raised 
but not decided in the Dubilier case. 
Enactment of any legislation on the subject is perhaps more 
important than the precise terms of the legislation. Although 
such a view might be unacceptable to those who have developed 
a modus vivendi under present regulations, it would seem that any 
advance toward certainty in a confused field would be beneficial. 
In considering legislation congressional committees would be pre-
sented with a great variety of opinion, and would be able to weigh 
intelligently the conflicting interests and equities. 
The subject has been presented to and discussed in Congress 
before in many different forms but never on a comprehensive 
basis with any sense of unity or urgency. 
As early as the period 1894-1907 the Navy Department sought 
legislation specifying its rights in inventions made by employ-
166 3 REP. ATIY. GEN. 153-157 (1947). The argument is based on Rev. Stat. §161, 
5 U.S.C. (1952) §22, which provides that "The head of each department is authorized 
to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, 
the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business and 
the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to 
it." The report cited one or two incidents said to demonstrate congressional acquiescence 
in departmental regulations governing the rights of employee and the government. Id. 
at 155-157. 
167 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 at 209 (1933). This 
statement has been interpreted by one commentator as applying only to retroactive regu-
lations, Kreeger, "The Control of Patent Rights Resulting from Federal Research,'' 12 
LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 714 at 721, n. 45 (1947). 
168 See note 90 supra. 
1957] FEDERAL EMPLOYEE INVENTION RIGHTS 959 
ees.169 During these years a number of bills were introduced, 
several of which passed one House of Congress, but legislation 
was not forthcoming. Out of the effort, however, grew a Joint 
Resolution of "February 18, 1907,170 directing the Secretary of 
Commerce and Labor to investigate the problem on a government-
wide basis. The ensuing report, 171 submitted to Congress on May 
5, 1908, recommended that government employees be treated in 
the same way that private inventors were treated, and stressed the 
need for legislation to dispel the confusion in the field. However, 
no action was taken on the report. 
The rights of employees were discussed at length in floor de-
bate on the bill which became the act providing for infringement 
suits against the government,172 but only in terms of the proviso 
disentitling employees from the benefits of the act. 
Discussion in hearings, reports, and floor debate on the bills, 
which would have authorized the Federal Trade Commission to 
exploit patents on inventions made by government employees 
(and others), introduced in the Sixty-fifth and Sixty-sixth Con-
gresses, recognized the lack of a fixed policy with respect to em-
ployee inventions, but the proposals narrowly missed enactment 
in 1921.173 
In 1922 President Harding by Executive Order 3721 estab-
lished an Interdepartmental Patents Board, which survived until 
its abolition by Executive Order 6166 in 1933. The Interdepart-
mental Patents Board in its eleven-year existence made a number 
of legislative proposals which included schemes for determining 
rights in employee inventions; several of the proposals were put 
into bill form and introduced in Congress, but none were passed. 
(The principal congressional interest in the proposals concerned 
the exclusive licensing provisions.174) 
Employee rights were also considered at length in the con-
gressional consideration of various proposals for national science 
legislation, introduced after World War II which eventually re-
sulted in laws establishing the National Science Foundation and 
169 See 3 REP. ATIY. GEN. 167-169 (1947). 
170 Pub. Res. No. 15 (H. J. Res. 224), 59th Cong., 2d sess. (1907). 
171 H.R. Doc. 914, 60th Cong., 1st sess. (1908). The report, noted (at 7), "There are 
certain doctrines of law but these have received no uniform development with regard 
to the Government employees. • • ." 
172 Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 851, note 86 supra, and accompanying text. 
173 See note 128 supra. 
174 For extensive discussion of the various proposals of the Interdepartmental Patents 
Board, and congressional reception of the proposals, see 3 REP. ATIY. GEN. 184-208 (1947). 
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the Office of Technical Services.175 However, most of the com-
ments in· hearings and debates which concerned the subject of em-
ployee rights were extremely general in nature, and no compre-
hensive approach to the subject was proposed. · 
Finally, one of the activities of the Government Patents Board 
in recent years has been an attempt to draft comprehensive legis-
lation on the subject.176 
Perhaps the principal explanation of the failure to arrive at 
a legislative solution, aside from the fact that scientific personnel 
in government have no organized group equipped to protect the 
particular interest involved, lies in the fact that conflicting phil-
osophies, such as the "title theory" and "license theory," have been 
supported with equal vigor by advocates from the various execu-
tive agencies. This divergence in views has fairly effectively para-
lyzed executive leadership in proposing legislation. The time has 
perhaps come, however, when the need for statutory treatment, in 
view of the situation described in the introduction of this article, 
is serious enough to warrant concessions from various quarters. 
For this reason, the middle ground represented by prior judicial 
standards is believed to represent an ideal starting point for con-
gressional consid~ration. 
XI. Content of Proposed Legislation 
Substantive criteria for determining employees' rights in in-
ventions need not be complex. It is submitted that legislation on 
the subject can and should be straight-forward and direct, with a · 
minimum of detailed administrative complication. 
Another desirable objective is uniformity of treatment.177 
Resolution of the problem would be relatively simple if legisla-
tion empowered each government agency to establish its own cri-
teria-title theory, license theory, judicial standards, or some other 
system. Such legislation, however, would of necessity discriminate 
against those employees who happened to work for an agency 
which adopted a strict policy, and might tend to encourage com-
175 National Science Foundation Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 149, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§1861-
1875; act of September 9, 1950, 64 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1151-1157. See note 85 supra. 
176 Interview with tbe Chairman, Government Patents Board, December 7, 1956. 
177 The desirability of a uniform policy has long been noted in congressional hear-
ings, e.g., Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents, 65th Cong., 3d sess., 3, 6 
(1919); Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Patents, 65th Cong., 3d sess., 4, 24 
(1919); Hearings Before tbe Senate Committee on Patents, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 10 (1920); 
Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 5, 17 (1946). 
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petition among the agencies for employees. The President, in 
authorizing the study which culminated in the 1947 Attorney 
General's Report, noted the "need for a uniform Government-wide 
policy."178 
It is sometimes urged that the differences in objectives of the 
various agencies necessitate varying policies in this field. For ex-
ample, public welfare agencies, such as the Departments of Agri-
culture, Interior, and Health, Education and Welfare, have as 
one of their objectives the providing of research facilities for areas 
of the economy which do not otherwise support such research, 
whereas other agencies, such as the military departments,. have as 
one of their primary objectives attainment of the most effective 
defense program for the taxpayer's dollar. However, even aside 
from the obvious limitations on the significance of this distinction, 
it is submitted that on balance the importance of the distinction 
fades in comparison with the overriding scientific morale bene-
fits to be derived from a uniform policy. 
With these broad objectives established, preparation of a bill 
is simplified. As indicated previously, it is believed that the cri-
teria pronounced in the Dubilier and other Supreme Court cases 
should provide the foundation of legislation. Administrative pro-
cedures should be left to the discretion of the respective agency 
heads, subject, however, to an appeal on behalf of any employee 
who believes himself aggrieved. A statutory admonition against 
adverse treatment of an employee who exercises his right of appeal 
should be included for whatever effect it may have in encouraging 
dissatisfied employees to appeal. 
The selection of an appropriate appellate body raises certain 
problems. Many government personnel believe that the appellate 
function should not be lodged in a separate administrator or agency, 
178 I REP. ATIY. GEN. 9 (1947). The Attorney General's Report endorsed this view, 
I REP. ATIY. GEN. 54-55, 143 (1947), and cited examples of potential difficulties which 
might arise if employees of different agencies having different policies made inventions 
in the same field (e.g., in interference proceedings). Further, industry's access to free 
use of employees' inventions "should not turn upon so fortuitous a factor as which 
department has developed" them. Id. at 55. The 1923 Interdepartmental Patents Board 
report,' S. Doc. 83, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 3, decried the lack of "any general governmental 
policy" in this field. Uniformity was one of the objectives of the bills introduced in the 
65th and 66th Congresses (see note 128 supra); e.g., testimony by advocates of the legis-
lation in Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents, 65th Cong., 3d sess., 3, 6, 
24 (1919). (Mr. Edward S. Rogers stated at 3: "One of the purposes of this bill is to 
make it possible to unify the practice in the various bureaus of the Government in the 
matter of inventions made in the Government service.") Cf. statements by Congressman 
Lanham, Chairman of the House Committee on Patents, in hearings before that com-
mittee in the 79th Cong., 2d sess., 5, 17 (1946). 
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because of the inevitable bureaucratic tendency to build "em-
pires" of authority. The authors express no opinion on this point, 
but note that the need for an administrator (with the necessary 
staff) would not seem justified in view of the meager workload 
anticipated under the statutory system proposed. Although either 
the Civil Service Commission or the General Services Administra-
tion179 has been proposed as the proper appellate body, the authors 
believe that the Department of Justice is a more logical selection. 
The function of the Attorney General in defending patent in-
fringement suits brought against the government180 is recognized, 
but it is believed that action on appeals from agency determina-
tions of rights in employee inventions could be kept separate from 
and independent of the purely advocatory function of the Attor-
ney General. Provision for an appeal to the courts by an aggrieved 
employee would help to assure this separation of function. 
Finally, the proposed legislation should provide: sufficient flexi-
bility to permit handling of such subsidiary problems as foreign 
rights,181 authority to leave title with an employee when the gov-
ernment would ordinarily be entitled to an assignment of title 
but is insufficiently interested in the particular invention to file 
a patent application thereon,182 authority to issue regulations im-
plementing the legislation, and provision for meetings of the per-
sons who administer the law for the respective agencies. 
Enactment of the proposed statute would require related 
changes in other provisions of law dealing with the subject. Res-
cission of Executive Orders 10096 and 9865 would be necessary. 
More important, however, would be revision of the limitations on 
employees' rights to sue the government, presently set forth in 28 
179 The Administrator of General Services has general responsibility for procurement, 
management, utilization, and disposal of government property, under the Federal Prop• 
erty and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 378, 40 U.S.C. (1952) §§471-514. 
However, this fact in itself might prejudice application of statutory standards by GSA, 
because of the underlying assumption that employee inventions are essentially govern-
ment property. 
180 R.S. §361, as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) §306; act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 942, 
as amended, 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1498. 
181 Presently covered by Executive Order 9865, 12 FED. R.Ec. 3907 (1947), the subject 
of foreign rights appears to be a flexible matter best left to case-by-case treatment. 
182 This problem has caused administrative difficulties. Assuming that the govern-
ment owns equitable title to a given employee invention under judicial standards, queare 
the legality of leaving title with the employee under paragraph l (b) of Executive Order 
10096 (see discussion in Part II supra) on grounds of insufficient government interest in 
the subject matter, in the light of Congress' exclusive power to dispose of government 
property (Art. IV, U.S. CONST., Sec. 3, cl. 2). 
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U.S.C. §1498, to make the limitations match the situations spelled 
out in the proposed determination of rights legislation.183 
A final qualification is necessary. The authors recognize that 
the rise of group research with the attendant de-emphasis on the 
inventive contribution of the individual inventor has subjected 
the patent system to serious scrutiny, and that proposals for sub-
stantial revision of the system are still being sought.184 In this 
context employees' rights legislation is ancillary to the patent sys-
tem itself. If the patent laws undergo major amendment, em-
ployee invention legislation should reflect the change. The pro-
posal set forth below, which is designed to carry out the objectives 
emphasized in this article and is offered as a legislative starting 
point, is based upon the law as it stands in 1957. 
AN AcT 
To establish a policy for the determination of rights of the 
Government and its employees in inventions made by such em-
ployees and to set forth criteria to be used in making such deter-
minations. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the "Employee Invention Rights Act of 1957." 
Congressional Declaration of Policy 
SEc. 2. It is the intent of the Congress in enacting this legis-
lation (a) to encourage employees of the Government to make 
and disclose inventions, in aid of the national defense and in 
furtherance of the public health, safety, economy, and welfare; 
(b) to assure that prompt185 administrative proceedings are avail-
183 In addition, 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1498 could be amended so as to bar any action by 
an employee who has not received an administrative determination of his rights in the 
patented inventions sued on. 
184 "I. The present patent system should be adjusted to modern conditions 
"When the patent laws were first drawn, invention and discovery were almost ex-
clusively the product of the efforts of individuals working alone. Today, invention and 
discovery are largely the work of research laboratories. In other words, individual enter-
prise has been gradually yielding to collective enterprise." S. Rep. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d 
sess., l (1956). Cf. Bush, "Proposals for Improving the Patent System," Study No. l of the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 8-9 (1956). 
185 Prompt administrative determination of rights may avoid prolonged and com-
plicated patent litigation. The last patent suit growing out of World War I, Thompson 
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able to establish the rights of the Government in inventions, many 
of which result from the expenditure of government funds for 
scientific and technological research and developments, made by 
government employees; and (c) to provide policies, procedures, 
and criteria to assure uniform and fair determination of the respec-
tive rights of the Government and its employees in all inventions 
made by such employees. 
Definitions 
SEc. 3. As used in this Act-
(a) The term "agency" means any executive department or 
independent establishment in the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment, including any wholly-owned government corporation.186 
(b) The term "employee" means any officer, enlisted man, or 
employee of any agency, except such part-time consultants or em-
ployees as may be excepted by regulations issued by the heads of 
the respective agencies. 
(c) The term "invention" means any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter which is or may 
be patentable under the patent laws of the United States. 
- Criteria for Determination of Rights 
SEC. 4. Except as otherwise provided by law, each agency 
shall determine rights in inventions made by employees of that 
agency in accordance with the following criteria and in accord-
ance with such regulations as may be issued by the head of such 
agency in conformance with these criteria: 
v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 402, was not decided until 1944. Prompt decision, plus 
encouragement of employee patenting, may substantially benefit the government: "At 
the present time there are a large number of suits for infringement of patents pending 
in the Court of Claims in which the amount claimed is something over $600,000,000. It 
is well known by the departments that in a number of instances the inventions involved 
in these suits were made by Government employees, but for one reason or another were 
not patented .... " H.R. Rep. No. 871, 70th Cong., 1st sess., I (1928). 
186 Although this comprehensive definition includes agencies such as the Atomic 
Energy Commission, National Science Foundation, and Tennessee Valley Authority, which 
at present have special statutory guidance in the field of employee rights, it is believed 
to be proper. Perhaps the special statutes should be repealed to conform standards of 
these agencies to government-wide standards. Even if not, the broad definition of "agency" 
would not create difficulties, because as long as the special statutes stay on the books, 
they are taken out of the operation of the proposed bill by the qualifying phrase 
("except as otherwise provided by law") in section 4. 
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(a) Title to any invention made by an employee shall be in 
the employee, subject to no rights in the Government (unless 
otherwise provided by law), unless the invention was made under 
circumstances described in (b) or (c) below. 
(b) Title to an invention made by an employee shall be in 
the employee, subject to a nonexclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free, 
world-wide license to the Government to practice and cause to be 
practiced the invention by or for the Government, if the invention 
was made or developed to practical form with a substantial con-
tribution by the Government of time, facilities, equipment, mate-
rials, or funds, and the invention was not made under circum-
stances covered by (c) below. 
(c) Title to an invention shall be in the Government, sub-
ject to no rights in the employee, if the invention is the direct 
result of a specific hiring or assignment of duty to make the in-
vention. 
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of (c) above, if the agency 
concerned finds that the Government is entitled to an assign-
ment of title to the invention but is insufficiently interested in 
the invention to publish the invention or to seek patent protec-
tion, it may determine that domestic and/ or foreign title in the 
invention shall be left in the employee subject to a nonexclusive, 
irrevocable, royalty-free, world-wide license to the Government to 
practice and cause to be practiced the invention by or for the 
Government. 
Procedures 
SEC. 5. In each case in which rights in an invention are 
determined under this act, the agency shall prepare a written 
determination of rights, including a statement of facts and sup-
porting reasons, and shall furnish a copy of the determination to 
the employee-inventor. The determination shall be administra-
tively final unless the employee appeals to the Attorney General 
within 45 days from the date the determination is transmitted to 
him. Upon receipt of an appeal, the Attorney General shall 
request the views of the agency and shall, after reviewing all avail-
able information (by means of hearings if necessary), render a 
decision sustaining, modifying, or reversing the agency determi-
nation. The decision of the Attorney General shall be adminis-
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tratively final. In no case shall the fact that an employee exer-
cises any right of appeal under this Act be used against him, for 
promotion or other purposes. 
Judicial Review 
SEc. 6. Any employee aggrieved by the final determination 
of the Attorney General may file a petition for a review of the 
determination in the court of appeals of the United States for 
any circuit having jurisdiction over the residence of the inventor, 
or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, within one year of the date of the determination of the Attor-
ney General. 
